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Iancu v. Brunetti’s Impact on First Amendment Law:  Viewpoint 




This article analyzes and contextualizes multiple effects on First Amendment 
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court’s 2019 trademark ruling in Iancu 
v. Brunetti.  It explores what the five opinions in the case reveal regarding the 
justices’ divergent views on both offensive speech and standards of scrutiny.  The 
six-justice Brunetti majority struck down part of the federal Lanham Act that allowed 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) to deny registration to marks 
it deemed immoral or scandalous.  Yet several justices wanted to permit the PTO to 
reject registration for vulgar or profane marks that offend based not on the ideas or 
views conveyed, but rather because of the manner and mode of expression.  
Furthermore, the majority specified it was silent about such a censorial mode-of-
expression possibility.  Beyond examining what this portends for Congress in 
drafting a new statute, the article also considers: (1) Brunetti’s implications for the 
doctrine against viewpoint-based discrimination; (2) Justice Stephen Breyer’s 
continued assault on the Court’s traditional categorical approach to First Amendment 
cases; and (3) how Brunetti indirectly breathes life into the Federal Communications 
Commission’s quiescent regulation of profanity on the broadcast airwaves.  
Ultimately, while the Court under Chief Justice John Roberts’s leadership has 
protected offensive speech in cases such as Snyder v. Phelps and United States v. 
Stevens, the quintet of opinions in Brunetti reveals that this benevolence has limits, 
especially when government protection confers benefits upon such expression. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In June 2019, the United States Supreme Court in Iancu v. Brunetti held that part 
of a federal statute vesting the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) 
with authority to refuse registration for marks it deemed immoral or scandalous 
violated the First Amendment guarantee of free speech.1  Writing for a six-justice 
majority, Elena Kagan concluded that both facets of this provision—its “immoral” 
and “scandalous” components—were unconstitutional because they let the PTO 
impermissibly discriminate against viewpoints.2 
Specifically, Justice Kagan explained that the PTO had used the statute to rebuff 
registration for “marks communicating ‘immoral’ or ‘scandalous’ views about . . . 
drug use, religion, and terrorism,” while simultaneously approving “registration of 
marks expressing more accepted views on the same topics.”3  In brief, the PTO took 
sides.  It discriminated against some ideas and opinions under the statute, violating 
what Kagan called “a core postulate of free speech law.”4  The Court’s ruling now 
affords Erik Brunetti the right to register “FUCT”—a mark that both a PTO 
examining attorney and the agency’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) 
declared immoral and scandalous—for a line of clothing.5 
The outcome in Brunetti was unsurprising for two key reasons.  First, the Court 
just two years before, in Matal v. Tam, had struck down another part of the same law 
that allowed the PTO to block registration for disparaging marks.6  That case pivoted 
on Simon Tam’s efforts to register “The Slants” as the mark for his band comprising 
Asian Americans.7  While Tam, the group’s frontman, sought to register the mark to 
reclaim a derogatory term for Asians,8 the PTO rejected his application, finding it 
 
 1. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019).  The statute at issue was 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), which 
in relevant part allowed the PTO to deny registration if a mark “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral, 
deceptive, or scandalous matter.”  15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2018) (emphasis added).   
  The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The Free 
Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated ninety-five years ago through the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local government entities 
and officials.  See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (finding “that freedom of speech and of 
the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among the 
fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment from impairment by the States”). 
 2. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2299–2300. 
 3. Id. at 2300. 
 4. Id. at 2299. 
 5. Id. at 2297–98.  Among other things, the TTAB found “FUCT” was highly offensive and 
vulgar, adding that Erik Brunetti, an artist and entrepreneur who founded a clothing line that uses the 
trademark FUCT, used it on his website and in close proximity to imagery in a misogynistic and depraved 
manner.  Id. 
 6. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017); see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2018) (allowing the PTO to 
deny registration for marks that “may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or 
dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute” (emphasis 
added)).  
 7. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751. 
 8. See id. (observing that “the band members believe that by taking that slur as the name of their 
group, they will help to ‘reclaim’ the term and drain its denigrating force”). 
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offensive and disparaging to a substantial composite of members of that ethnicity.9  
Handing Simon Tam a victory, all eight justices who participated in the case 
concluded that the disparagement clause was fatally viewpoint-based, although they 
split neatly into two blocs of four in expressing that position.10 
Additionally, Tam buttressed the principle that the First Amendment generally 
protects offensive speech.  As Justice Samuel Alito wrote in delivering the Court’s 
opinion, the disparagement clause “offends a bedrock First Amendment principle:  
Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”11  Alito 
added that the notion that “[t]he Government has an interest in preventing speech 
expressing ideas that offend . . . strikes at the heart of the First Amendment.”12 
Second, the result in Brunetti was largely predictable because the Court, under 
Chief Justice John Roberts’s leadership in cases beyond Tam, generally has been 
favorable to protecting a wide swath of expression that some, for various reasons, 
might consider offensive.  For example, in Snyder v. Phelps, the Court in 2011 
shielded from tort liability members of the Westboro Baptist Church who hoisted 
signs emblazoned with messages such as “God Hates Fags,” “Thank God for Dead 
Soldiers,” and “Pope in Hell” near a funeral for a U.S. soldier killed on duty in Iraq.13  
That same year, the Roberts Court also vitiated a law restricting minors’ access to 
graphically violent video games.14  Furthermore, with Roberts at the helm, the Court 
 
 9. Id. at 1754.  
 10. Writing a portion of the opinion joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence 
Thomas and Stephen Breyer, Justice Samuel Alito reasoned that “[o]ur cases use the term ‘viewpoint’ 
discrimination in a broad sense . . . and in that sense, the disparagement clause discriminates on the bases 
of ‘viewpoint.’”  Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1673.  Alito added that the disparagement clause “denies registration 
to any mark that is offensive to a substantial percentage of the members of any group” and that, in turn, 
“[g]iving offense is a viewpoint.”  Id.  
  Engaging in a much more extensive discussion of the rule against viewpoint-based 
discrimination, Justice Anthony Kennedy—joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, 
and Elena Kagan—explained that under the disparagement clause, “an applicant may register a positive 
or benign mark but not a derogatory one.  The law thus reflects the Government’s disapproval of a subset 
of messages it finds offensive.  This is the essence of viewpoint discrimination.”  Id. at 1766 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring).  Kennedy elaborated that “the test for viewpoint discrimination is whether—within the 
relevant subject category—the government has singled out a subset of messages for disfavor based on the 
views expressed.”  Id.  
  See generally Clay Calvert, Beyond Trademarks and Offense: Tam and the Justices’ Evolution 
on Free Speech, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 25, 49–54 (2017) [hereinafter Calvert, Beyond Trademarks] 
(comparing and contrasting the approaches of Justices Alito and Kennedy in Tam on the issue of 
viewpoint-based discrimination). 
 11. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751. 
 12. Id. at 1764. 
 13. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 448 (2011).  The seven members of the Westboro Baptist 
Church who participated in this particular protest, including its then-leader, the Reverend Fred Phelps, 
stood peacefully for about thirty minutes on public land approximately 1,000 feet away from the church 
where the funeral was held.  Id. at 448–49.  
 14. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011).  The statute at issue in Brown can 
reasonably be said to have targeted offensive speech because the violent video games it covered were 
defined, in key part, as those featuring the “killing, maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting [of] 
an image of a human being” in a way that “appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of minors.”  Id. at 789.  
The majority in Brown held that the law failed to survive the strict scrutiny test that typically applies to 
content-based statutes.  Id. at 799–800.  
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invalidated a federal statute that targeted images of animal cruelty and, in the process, 
refused to carve out a new category of unprotected expression for such depictions.15  
Additionally, the Court in 2012 declared unconstitutional, due to its vastly expansive 
nature, a federal statute that made it crime to lie about having won a Congressional 
Medal of Honor.16 
Although Brunetti’s outcome was therefore foreseeable, the totality of the five 
opinions it spawned demonstrates there are:  (1) limits on just how far some justices 
will go in safeguarding offensive expression, especially when such protection results 
in government-conferred benefits; (2) significant problems, including definitional 
ones, with carving out new exceptions for some varieties of offensive expression; 
and (3) doctrinal disagreements among the justices regarding how such cases should 
be analyzed.  These issues and others are the focus of this Article. 
Despite Brunetti’s decidedly pro-free speech conclusion and its unmistakable 
reinforcement of the First Amendment doctrine prohibiting viewpoint-based 
discrimination of speech, it was anything but a simple repeat or decisional 
doppelgänger of Tam.  In particular, Part I examines how Brunetti exposes fissures 
in the Court’s historically sturdy wall of protection safeguarding offensive speech.  
Specifically, Part I delves into the willingness of at least four justices—and quite 
possibly all nine—to allow the PTO to block registration for marks that offend 
because of their mode of expression rather than because of the underlying viewpoints 
or ideas they convey.  In the process, it also explores how three justices in Brunetti—
Chief Justice Roberts, as well as Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor—
were disposed to giving the word “scandalous” (but not “immoral”) a narrowing 
construction to save it from unconstitutionality. 
Part II has two sections. First, it critiques Justice Breyer’s now relentless assault 
 
 15.  United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).  The U.S. Supreme Court has held that multiple 
types of expression are not protected by the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.  See United States v. 
Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (identifying unprotected categories of expression as including 
incitement to violence, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, fighting words, child 
pornography, fraud, true threats, and “speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government 
has the power to prevent”); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002) (providing that 
the First Amendment’s “freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of speech, 
including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real children”).  The law at 
issue in Stevens can fairly be said to target offensive speech because the legislative intent behind it was to 
regulate “crush videos” featuring “the intentional torture and killing of helpless animals, including cats, 
dogs, monkeys, mice, and hamsters.”  Stevens, 559 U.S. at 465.  In striking down the statute, the Court 
rejected the government’s position that “the banned depictions of animal cruelty, as a class, are 
categorically unprotected by the First Amendment.”  Id. at 468.  The Court suggested it would not create 
new categories of speech unprotected by the First Amendment unless the speech in question has “been 
historically unprotected.”  Id. at 472.  In delivering the majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts observed 
that “we are unaware of any similar tradition excluding depictions of animal cruelty from ‘the freedom of 
speech’ codified in the First Amendment, and the Government points us to none.”  Id. at 469. 
 16. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012).  In announcing the Court’s judgment in a plurality opinion 
striking down the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Justice Anthony Kennedy also rejected the twin notions that 
“all proscriptions of false statements are exempt from exacting First Amendment scrutiny” and that “false 
speech should be in a general category that is presumptively unprotected.”  Id. at 720–22.  The Stolen 
Valor Act of 2005 can reasonably be viewed as targeting offensive expression because, as Justice Kennedy 
opined, “the lie may offend the true holders of the Medal.  From one perspective it insults their bravery 
and high principles when falsehood puts them in the unworthy company of a pretender.”  Id. at 726.   
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on the Court’s traditional and categorical tiers-of-scrutiny approach to analyzing free 
speech cases and his efforts to replace that methodology with his preferred 
proportionality tack.17  Second, it examines Justice Sotomayor’s willingness to apply 
a standard of review less rigorous than strict scrutiny to content-based laws that do 
not discriminate against viewpoints, at least in contexts where protecting speech is 
coupled with government-bestowed benefits, as it is with federal trademark 
registration.18  Part II also ponders how an offensive-mode-of-expression rule, as 
envisioned by Justice Sotomayor, might evade strict scrutiny in contexts beyond 
Brunetti, even in the face of the Court’s 2015 decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert.19 
Next, Part III analyzes how Brunetti may provide the key for the Federal 
Communications Commission to jumpstart its currently dormant enforcement of a 
statute allowing it to regulate profane language on the broadcast airwaves.20  Finally, 
the Article concludes in Part IV by suggesting that the Court in Brunetti has, in fact, 
paved the path for Congress to draft a new, more precise statute granting the PTO 
authority to deny registration to marks that offend because of their shockingly vulgar 
and profane mode of expression, irrespective of the underlying opinions, ideas, or 
viewpoints that they convey. 
I. OFFENSIVE SPEECH AND MODES OF EXPRESSION:  EXPOSING 
CRACKS IN THE WALL OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
This Part has three sections.  Section A reviews the Supreme Court’s generally 
stout and vigorous protection of offensive speech over approximately the past half-
century.  Section B then illustrates how Brunetti adds teeth to the already robust rule 
against viewpoint-based discrimination of speech.  Section C, however, explores:  (a) 
the willingness of, at a minimum, four justices (both perceived conservatives and 
liberals, no less) in Brunetti to chip away at the bulwark of First Amendment 
protection for offensive speech, at least in the trademark-registration context; (b) 
some of the key reasons propelling that willingness; and (c) the different proposals 
for restricting the protection.  Of particular importance is the possibility of restricting 
speech that offends not because of the ideas conveyed, but due to the mode and 
manner in which such ideas are expressed. 
 
 17. See Donald L. Beschle, No More Tiers? Proportionality as an Alternative to Multiple Levels of 
Scrutiny in Individual Rights Cases, 38 PACE L. REV. 384, 419 (2018) (observing that Breyer “has shown 
some enthusiasm for proportionality analysis in his separate opinions”); Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court 
2017 Term: Foreword: Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 55 (2018) (“Proportionality and 
balancing approaches to rights have long found favor with Justice Breyer.”). 
 18. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015) (observing that strict scrutiny 
requires the government to prove that a statute “furthers a compelling governmental interest and is 
narrowly tailored to that end”); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (asserting 
that a content-based speech restriction can withstand judicial review only “if it satisfies strict scrutiny,” 
opining that “[i]f a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a 
compelling Government interest,” and adding that “if a less restrictive alternative would serve the 
Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that alternative”). 
 19. Reed, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
 20. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2018) (making it unlawful to convey “any obscene, indecent, or profane 
language by means of radio communication”). 
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A. PROTECTING OFFENSIVE EXPRESSION 
Beyond the decisions noted above protecting offensive speech under Chief Justice 
Roberts’s leadership,21 the Court has safeguarded other varieties of offensive 
expression—stretching from racial to political to sexual—during the past fifty-plus 
years.  For instance, the Court in 1969 in Brandenburg v. Ohio ruled in favor of a Ku 
Klux Klan leader who was prosecuted for delivering a racist and anti-Semitic speech 
to his followers on an Ohio farm.22  It held that such speech only falls outside the 
ambit of First Amendment protection if it is “directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”23 
Two years later, the Court in Cohen v. California shielded Paul Robert Cohen 
from criminal punishment after he wore a jacket sporting the message “Fuck the 
Draft” in a Los Angeles courthouse to protest conscription and the war in Vietnam.24  
In protecting what it called the “emotive function” of speech, the Court in Cohen 
acknowledged the definitional difficulties of trying to explicate precisely which types 
of offensive speech should not be protected, explaining that: 
[W]hile the particular four-letter word being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful 
than most others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true that one man’s vulgarity is 
another’s lyric.  Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental officials cannot 
make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and 
style so largely to the individual.25 
Furthermore, the Court in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell in 1988 ruled in favor of 
a sexually explicit adult magazine’s right to make fun of a then-leading conservative 
religious and political figure by suggesting, in a parody of a Campari liqueur 
advertisement, that he had sex with his mother in an outhouse, preached while drunk, 
and was a hypocrite.26  In shielding the magazine and its notorious publisher, Larry 
Flynt,27 from tort liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) 
supposedly caused to the Reverend Jerry Falwell by the ad parody, Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist acknowledged the content was “doubtless gross and repugnant in 
 
 21. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. 
 22. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).  Among other statements, Clarence Brandenburg, 
using a racial epithet, expressed the undoubtedly offensive sentiment that blacks “should be returned to 
Africa, the Jew returned to Israel.”  Id. at 447.  He added that “if our President, our Congress, our Supreme 
Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be some 
revengeance [sic] taken.”  Id. at 446. 
 23. Id. at 447. 
 24. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971) (“The defendant testified that he wore the jacket 
knowing that the words were on the jacket as a means of informing the public of the depth of his feelings 
against the Vietnam War and the draft.”). 
 25. Id. at 25–26. 
 26. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988). 
 27. See generally Clay Calvert & Robert Richards, Larry Flynt Uncensored: A Dialogue with the 
Most Controversial Figure in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 9 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 159 (2001) 
(providing a comprehensive interview with Flynt, including his reflections on the Falwell case). 
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the eyes of most.”28  Yet the Court ruled against Falwell, stressing he was a public 
figure and emphasizing “the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and 
opinions on matters of public interest and concern.”29  Falwell, Rehnquist explained, 
could only recover for IIED by proving “that the publication contains a false 
statement of fact which was made with ‘actual malice,’ i.e., with knowledge that the 
statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.”30  
That was something Falwell simply could not do; no reasonable person would 
believe the parody was a factual assertion.31 
The next year, the Court in Texas v. Johnson protected the right to burn the 
American flag as a form of symbolic political protest.32  In penning the majority 
opinion, Justice William Brennan explained that “[i]f there is a bedrock principle 
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the 
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.”33  He characterized the Court’s decision as “a reaffirmation of the 
principles of freedom and inclusiveness that the flag best reflects, and of the 
conviction that our toleration of criticism such as Johnson’s is a sign and source of 
our strength.”34 
In 1997, the Court held in Reno v. ACLU that two parts of the Communications 
Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”) that criminalized sexually offensive expression—
namely, what the CDA called “indecent” and “patently offensive” messages—on the 
Internet violated the First Amendment.35  Justice John Paul Stevens explained for the 
Court that “the many ambiguities concerning the scope of [the CDA’s] coverage 
render it problematic for First Amendment purposes.”36  The imprecision and 
vagueness issues that riddled the statute were particularly problematic, Stevens 
pointed out, because the law imposed “a content-based regulation of speech” and 
carried with it criminal punishment.37 
 
 28. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 50.  Intentional infliction of emotional distress traditionally pivots on “four 
elements: (1) the defendant’s conduct must be intentional or reckless, (2) the conduct must be outrageous 
and intolerable, (3) the defendant’s conduct must cause the plaintiff emotional distress and (4) the distress 
must be severe.”  Karen Markin, The Truth Hurts: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Cause 
of Action Against the Media, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 469, 476 (2000). 
 29. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 50, 57. 
 30. Id. at 56.  The Court in Falwell basically borrowed the actual malice standard from the realm 
of libel law, where the Court had adopted it in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  In 
Sullivan, the Court held that public officials suing for libel based upon speech regarding their official 
conduct must prove that the defamatory statement at issue “was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”  Id. at 297–98.  See 
Nat Stern, The Force of a Legal Concept: The Steady Extension of the Actual Malice Standard, 12 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 449, 456 (2014) (noting that in Falwell, “the Court not only introduced the actual malice 
standard to IIED doctrine, but also injected libel’s requirement of a false statement of fact into a tort that 
had not included this element”). 
 31. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 57. 
 32. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 33. Id. at 414. 
 34. Id. at 419. 
 35. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997). 
 36. Id. at 870. 
 37. Id. at 871, 874.  
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Five years later, the Court in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition held that a federal 
law targeting another form of offensive speech—virtual child pornography38—was 
unconstitutionally overbroad.39  In reaching this determination, Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated that the statute, among its other flaws, swept 
up “[a]ny depiction of sexually explicit activity, no matter how it [was] presented.”40  
More specifically, it would apply to “a picture in a psychology manual, as well as a 
movie depicting the horrors of sexual abuse” and “a Renaissance painting depicting 
a scene from classical mythology.”41  Kennedy suggested that the statute, which 
failed to protect speech that had serious literary and artistic value,42 might even have 
applied to then-popular mainstream movies such as Traffic and American Beauty in 
which it appeared minors were engaged in sexually explicit conduct.43 
In brief, the Court typically has been highly protective of offensive expression 
over the past half-century.44  Yet this shelter is not absolute.  For instance, the Court 
historically tolerates punishment of offensive expression when language is used in a 
very narrow context such that it rises to the level of unprotected fighting words.45  
 
 38. Specifically, the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 made it a crime to possess and 
distribute “sexually explicit images that appear[ed] to depict minors but were produced without using any 
real children.”  Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 239 (2002).  It targeted such images that 
were “created by using adults who look like minors or by using computer imaging.”  Id. at 239–40. 
 39. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 258.  A law is impermissibly overbroad if “a substantial amount 
of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the process” of regulating unprotected expression.  Id. at 
255. 
 40. Id. at 246. 
 41. Id. at 241, 246. 
 42. See id. at 246 (noting that the law “prohibits speech despite its serious literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific value”). 
 43. Id. at 247–48. 
 44. See Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Free Speech and the Right to Offend: Old Wars, New 
Battles, Different Media, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 671, 676 (2002) (“The general rule is that speech may not 
be censored solely because some find it offensive.”). 
 45.  The Court held more than seventy-five years ago that the regulation of fighting words has 
“never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 
572 (1942).  At that time, it defined fighting words as “those which by their very utterance inflict injury 
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”  Id.  The Court later narrowed the definition to 
“personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common 
knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction” and that constitute “a direct personal insult.”  
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).  See Dan T. Coenen, Freedom of Speech and the Criminal 
Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1533, 1548 (2017) (noting that the Court “has—from all appearances—abandoned 
the notion that certain words are subject to regulation on the theory that ‘their very utterance’ causes 
harm”).   
  Thus, the fighting words doctrine targets offensive speech directed at specific individuals.  Terri 
R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, Speech Narcissism, 70 FLA. L. REV. 839, 867, n.206 (2018) (“Fighting 
words are offensive words specifically targeted to an individual that would likely cause an average person 
to fight.”).  For instance, offensive speech in the form of “racial slurs can constitute fighting words if they 
are directed at particular individuals and when they are considered in conjunction with the speaker’s 
actions and proximity to the target of the speech.”  Clay Calvert, Fighting Words in the Era Of Texts, IMs 
and E-Mails: Can a Disparaged Doctrine be Resuscitated to Punish Cyber-Bullies?, 21 DEPAUL J. ART 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 27 (2010). See In re Spivey, 480 S.E.2d 693, 699 (N.C. 1997) (noting that 
“[n]o fact is more generally known than that” a white person who openly calls a black person by one 
especially serious racial epithet “will hurt and anger the black man and often provoke him to confront the 
white man and retaliate”).  
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Perhaps indicating the narrowness of this exception, however, the Court has never 
upheld another fighting words conviction since it created the exception in 1942.46 
Beyond fighting words scenarios, the Court has permitted the regulation of 
offensive but non-obscene expression in three primary settings:  (1) public schools; 
(2) regulatory frameworks where the speaker seeks or is otherwise granted special 
benefits by a federal agency that polices speech; and (3) when the government itself 
is deemed to be speaking.  The Court’s 1986 ruling in Bethel School District v. Fraser 
exemplifies the first situation.  The Court there upheld a public high school’s ability 
to punish a student for delivering what the majority called “a lewd speech at a school 
assembly” consisting of “an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.”47  
Contrasting the facts of Fraser with those of Cohen v. California, in which the Court 
safeguarded offensive speech,48 Chief Justice Warren Burger reasoned for the 
majority that “[i]t does not follow . . . that simply because the use of an offensive 
form of expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the speaker 
considers a political point, the same latitude must be permitted to children in a public 
school.”49  He added, referring to protagonist-speaker Matthew Fraser, that school 
officials possess authority to “determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature 
conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive 
speech and conduct such as that indulged in by this confused boy.”50 
Illustrative of the second situation is Federal Communications Commission v. 
Pacifica Foundation.51  There, the Court in 1978 upheld the statutory power of the 
FCC to punish radio and television stations for broadcasting indecent speech on the 
public airwaves even though it does not rise to the level of unprotected obscenity.52  
Deeming it “undisputed” that the George Carlin “Filthy Words” monologue at issue 
in the case “was ‘vulgar,’ ‘offensive,’ and ‘shocking,’” the Court stressed that the 
nature of the medium—in this case, broadcasting—is relevant in determining 
whether such speech is regulatable.53  It added that speech in the over-the-air 
broadcast realm can be controlled more closely than expression in other forms of 
 
 46.  Burton Caine, The Trouble With “Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire Is a Threat 
to First Amendment Values and Should be Overruled, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 445 (2004); ERWIN 
CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1053–54 (5th ed. 2015). 
 47. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677–78 (1986).  
 48. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text (addressing Cohen). 
 49. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682. 
 50. Id. at 683. 
 51. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
 52. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2018) (“Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by 
means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or 
both.”) (emphasis added); Consumer Guide: Obscene, Indecent and Profane Broadcasts, FCC, https://
perma.cc/28LK-EK53 (last visited Oct. 2, 2019) (“Indecent content portrays sexual or excretory organs 
or activities in a way that does not meet the three-prong test for obscenity.”).  Obscene expression is 
unprotected by the First Amendment.  See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (concluding 
that “obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press”); see also Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (establishing the current three-part test for determining when speech is 
obscene). 
 53. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 747, 748 (“We have long recognized that each medium of 
expression presents special First Amendment problems.”). 
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media.54  That is partly because broadcasters act within a regulatory framework 
requiring them to serve the public interest and, in turn, conferring them with the 
benefit of a station license for doing so—a benefit revocable if they fail to nurture 
that interest.55 
Indicative of the third scenario is Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate 
Veterans.56  A five-justice majority held in 2015 that the speech on specialty license 
plates in Texas is not that of the private individuals who affix such plates to their 
vehicles, but is rather speech of the State of Texas.57  That determination was pivotal 
in Walker because, as Justice Stephen Breyer wrote for the majority, “[w]hen 
government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the 
content of what it says.”58  This allowed Texas—without violating the First 
Amendment—to block a specialty license plate proposed by the Sons of Confederate 
Veterans that bore an image of a Confederate battle flag that many Texans reportedly 
found offensive.59  Government speech, as Professor Mary-Rose Papandrea 
observes, is thus “immune to the usual restrictions of the First Amendment.”60  That 
immunity stretches, as it did in Walker,61 to the First Amendment’s usual bar against 
censoring speech because it offends and because of the viewpoint expressed.62 
How does Brunetti and the regulation at issue there fit into this framework of 
offensive speech cases?  Sections B and C below analyze that question. 
 
 54. See id. (“And of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most 
limited First Amendment protection.”). 
 55. See id. (noting that “a broadcaster may be deprived of his license and his forum if the 
Commission decides that such an action would serve ‘the public interest, convenience, and necessity’”). 
 56. Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015). 
 57. See id. at 2246 (“In our view, specialty license plates issued pursuant to Texas’s statutory 
scheme convey government speech.”). 
 58. Id. at 2245. 
 59. Id.  As Justice Breyer concluded for the majority, “we hold that Texas’s specialty license plate 
designs constitute government speech, and that Texas was consequently entitled to refuse to issue plates 
featuring SCV’s proposed design.”  Id. at 2253. 
 60. Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Government Brand, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1195, 1197 (2016). 
 61. The State of Texas in Walker clearly engaged in the same type of viewpoint-based 
discrimination that the Court in Brunetti found abhorrent to First Amendment principles.  Professor 
Frederick Schauer explains that: 
There is no question that Texas rejected the Confederate flag plate precisely because of the point 
of view it embodied, and no one claimed that a flag embodying the opposite viewpoint—the 
American flag—would have been excluded.  There is thus no plausible argument that Texas’s 
decision was not viewpoint-based.  The question was whether this was a form of viewpoint 
discrimination that the First Amendment prohibits. 
Frederick Schauer, Not Just About License Plates: Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Government 
Speech, and Doctrinal Overlap in the First Amendment, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 265, 281–82 (2015). 
 62. See Clay Calvert, The Government Speech Doctrine in Walker’s Wake: Early Rifts and 
Reverberations on Free Speech, Viewpoint Discrimination, and Offensive Expression, 25 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 1239, 1243 (2017) (“The government speech doctrine is a powerful weapon in a state’s arsenal 
for expression—one deployable both for promoting the government’s own viewpoint and, conversely, for 
squelching the views of others with which it disagrees.”). 
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B. VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION IS FORBIDDEN 
First and perhaps foremost, Brunetti reinforces the rule that speech causing 
offense because of the underlying ideas or views conveyed on a topic generally is 
protected by the First Amendment unless, as noted above, the government speech 
doctrine applies.63  Writing for the Brunetti majority, Justice Kagan—joined by 
Justices Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch and 
Brett Kavanaugh64—observed that this principle against viewpoint discrimination 
was something about which all of the justices in Tam agreed.65  As she put it, the 
“shared conclusion” in Tam was that the disparagement clause was doomed because 
it permitted viewpoint discrimination.66 
When does viewpoint discrimination occur?  Kagan suggested it arises when a 
law such as that in Brunetti “distinguishes between two opposed sets of ideas” 
regarding “the same topics.”67  In other words, as the Court wrote twenty-five years 
ago, viewpoint discrimination goes beyond the government simply targeting a 
particular subject matter in an evenhanded, viewpoint-neutral fashion to the 
government actually restraining speech that embraces some views on that subject 
while allowing others.68  The bar against registering immoral marks in Brunetti 
neatly fit this framework.  That is because, as Kagan wrote, it permitted “registration 
of marks that champion society’s sense of rectitude and morality, but not marks that 
denigrate those concepts.”69  All nine of the justices in Brunetti, in fact, concluded 
that the prohibition on immoral marks transgressed the rule against viewpoint 
discrimination.70 
The six-justice majority also held that the ban on registering scandalous marks 
 
 63. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2301 (2019) (noting that “a law disfavoring ‘ideas that 
offend’ discriminates based on viewpoint, in violation of the First Amendment”).  For a discussion of the 
government speech doctrine, see supra notes 56–62 and accompanying text. 
 64. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2295 (identifying the justices who joined Justice Kagan’s opinion for the 
Court). 
 65. See id. at 2299 (contending that in Tam, the justices “found common ground in a core postulate 
of free speech law: The government may not discriminate against speech based on the ideas or opinions 
it conveys”). 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 2300.  This comports with the traditional notion that: 
[v]iewpoint regulations go beyond regulating speech on a particular topic or subject matter.  They 
regulate one side of a debate or topic but not the other.  In brief, one viewpoint on a particular 
issue is treated more favorably under a law or court order than another on the same issue. 
Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Content-Neutrality: Inconsistent Applications of an Increasingly Malleable 
Doctrine, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 69, 76–77 (1997). 
 68. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
 69. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2299. 
 70. See id. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I agree with the 
majority that the ‘immoral’ portion of the provision is not susceptible of a narrowing construction that 
would eliminate its viewpoint bias.”); id. at 2308 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I 
agree with the Court . . . that the bar on registering ‘immoral’ marks violates the First Amendment.”); id. 
at 2309 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (opining with regard to “the word 
‘immoral,’ I agree with the majority that there is no tenable way to read it that would ameliorate the 
problem” of viewpoint discrimination, and adding that “immoral” “clearly connotes a preference for 
‘rectitude and morality’ over its opposite”). 
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violated the principle barring viewpoint discrimination.  Justice Kagan explained that 
this provision allowed the PTO to register “marks when their messages [were in] 
accord with, but not when their messages def[ied], society’s sense of decency or 
propriety.”71  She elaborated that the “scandalous” clause permitted registration 
solely of marks “inducing societal nods of approval” and not “those provoking 
offense and condemnation.”72  In other words, only one side of counterposed views 
on a topic were registrable—namely, the non-scandalous side.  For example, on the 
subject of drugs, the “scandalous” provision allowed the PTO to block registration 
for “MARIJUANA COLA” because it glamorized drug abuse, but to grant 
registration to “D.A.R.E. TO RESIST DRUGS AND VIOLENCE.”73  However, and 
as addressed later, three justices—Roberts, Breyer, and Sotomayor—were willing to 
narrowly construe the term “scandalous” to spare it from unconstitutionality.74 
Justice Alito wrote a brief concurrence in Brunetti emphasizing the importance of 
prohibiting viewpoint discrimination and, in turn, the need for the Court to vigilantly 
enforce the doctrine barring it.75  Calling such discrimination “poison to a free 
society,” Alito contended it is rising in the United States.76  Although he failed to 
identify a single example to support this assertion, it may be that Alito was, sub 
silentio, pushing back against the majority’s holding in Walker, noted above, that 
permitted viewpoint discrimination against a Confederate battle flag-adorned license 
plate because government speech ostensibly was at issue.77  Importantly, Alito had 
written a stinging dissent in Walker that was joined by three other conservative-
leaning justices.78  In it, he contended that Texas had engaged in impermissible 
viewpoint discrimination and that the majority’s decision, penned by Justice Breyer, 
“establishe[d] a precedent that threatens private speech that government finds 
displeasing.”79  Thus, it could be that in Brunetti, Alito was still bristling about the 
viewpoint discrimination that he perceived skated through unchecked in Walker. 
While Brunetti reinforces the principle that viewpoint-based discrimination 
against speech, including viewpoints that cause offense, is presumptively 
unconstitutional, several justices (and perhaps all) were willing to grant the PTO 
power to censor marks that offend not because of the idea or viewpoint conveyed, 
but because of the mode of expression itself.  That possible new carve-out for PTO 
regulation of offensive marks, along with the reasons for it and possible explications 
of it, are addressed immediately below. 
 
 71. Id. at 2300 (majority opinion). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See infra Part I.C. 
 75. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2302–03 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 76. Id. at 2302 (opining that “such discrimination has become increasingly prevalent in this 
country”). 
 77. See supra notes 56–62 and accompanying text (addressing Walker and the government speech 
doctrine). 
 78. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2254 (2015) (Alito, 
J., dissenting) (noting that Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy 
joined Alito’s dissent).  
 79. Id. at 2254, 2263. 
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C. CHIPPING AWAY AT THE WALL OF PROTECTION FOR OFFENSIVE SPEECH:  
THE JUSTICES’ CONCERNS ABOUT REGISTERING OFFENSIVE MARKS AND 
HOW THEY MIGHT DRAFT A BETTER STATUTE FOCUSING ON THE MODE OF 
EXPRESSION 
Brunetti indubitably is a free-speech-friendly decision because it struck down the 
PTO’s statutory authority to deny registration for immoral or scandalous marks.  Yet 
none of the nine justices foreclosed the possibility that a better drafted law (or, at 
least, one more narrowly construed by the justices when it comes to the meaning of 
“scandalous” marks) might survive First Amendment scrutiny.  Before analyzing the 
different tacks the justices would adopt to provide the PTO with authority to deny 
registration to certain offensive marks, it helps to understand both: (1) the worries 
that animated their efforts to salvage the PTO’s power in this realm; and (2) the 
justifications for taking such speech-restrictive action within the regulatory 
framework of federal trademark law. 
1. Worries About the Future of Trademark Registration 
In terms of frets about what Brunetti augurs for the future, Justice Alito was 
troubled that it will facilitate registering marks that “further coarsen our popular 
culture.”80  In brief, at least for Alito, the PTO needs some authority to police marks 
to uphold mores of civil communication, particularly when a mark such as FUCT “is 
not needed to express any idea.”81  Alito’s unease here parallels the reasoning of his 
lone dissent in Snyder v. Phelps, an offensive speech case noted earlier.82 
In Phelps, Alito blasted Westboro Baptist Church (“WBC”) members for 
“launching vicious verbal attacks that make no contribution to public debate.”83  
Safeguarding their speech simply was unnecessary, even in “a society in which 
public issues can be openly and vigorously debated.”84  Bridging Alito’s analysis of 
the offensive speech at issue in Brunetti and Phelps, the PTO should be allowed to 
deny registration for FUCT because it does not express any substantive ideas, and it 
coarsens culture, while the speech of the WBC can be punished in tort law because 
it does not contribute to public discourse and amounts to decidedly impolite 
expression.85  In brief, low-value speech—expression not essential for conveying 
ideas (Brunetti)86 and messages failing to contribute to public discourse (Phelps)87—
 
 80. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2303 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 81. Id.  
 82. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 463 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting); see also supra note 13 and 
accompanying text. 
 83. Phelps, 562 U.S. at 464. 
 84. Id. at 475. 
 85. Indeed, Alito made it clear the speech was anything but polite when he called it “a malevolent 
verbal attack.”  Id. at 463. 
 86. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2303 (Alito, J., concurring) (suggesting that regulation of vulgar 
speech that “play[s] no real part in the expression of ideas” can be regulated by the PTO under “a more 
carefully focused statute” (emphasis added)). 
 87. See Phelps, 562 U.S. at 474 (Alito, J., dissenting) (concluding that the speech of the WBC 
members that caused the plaintiff emotional distress “did not relate to a matter of public concern”). 
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that offends can be more easily restricted or punished in Justice Alito’s legal 
universe.  As the author of this Article contended in 2011, Alito generally “is no 
friend to expression that offends his personal sense of both morality and substantive 
merit.  In fact, he might be the justice most prone to censor offensive speech on 
today’s High Court.”88  Although he subsequently delivered the Court’s opinion in 
Tam declaring the disparagement clause unconstitutional,89 Alito’s opinion there is 
better viewed as delivering a blow to perceived political correctness rather than as 
defending offensive expression.90 
Other justices in Brunetti also expressed qualms about what might result from the 
case’s outcome.  For both Justice Breyer and Justice Sotomayor, those fears hinged 
in no small part on the possibility that attention-grabbing racist epithets might now 
serve as registered marks, sparking commotion and worse.  As Breyer put it, “Just 
think about how you might react if you saw someone wearing a t-shirt or using a 
product emblazoned with an odious racial epithet?”91  Similarly, Sotomayor noted 
that after Brunetti, the PTO will “presumably be compelled to register . . . at least 
one particularly egregious racial epithet.”92  In this vein, she agonized over the 
“coming rush to register” what she called “the most vulgar, profane, or obscene 
words and images imaginable.”93  In brief, the prospect that the federal government 
could be forced to sanction and convey legal benefits to, via the PTO’s registration 
process, racist epithets such as the “N word” troubled both Breyer and Sotomayor. 
2. Legal Hooks Upon Which to Hang the PTO’s Regulation of Offensive 
Marks 
If some justices were distressed that Brunetti might coarsen public discourse 
(Alito) or lead to the registration of racist marks (Breyer and Sotomayor), then the 
opening or entrée for vesting the PTO with authority to prevent such evils hinges 
chiefly on the nature of the PTO’s regulatory framework.  Specifically, that system:  
(1) confers upon mark holders, via federal registration, tangible legal benefits,94 as 
well as the intangible value of perceived government endorsement, but (2) does not 
 
 88. Clay Calvert, Justice Samuel A. Alito’s Lonely War Against Abhorrent, Low-Value Expression: 
A Malleable First Amendment Philosophy Privileging Subjective Notions of Morality and Merit, 40 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 115, 115 (2011). 
 89. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
 90. See Calvert, Beyond Trademarks, supra note 10, at 34–35 (contending that Alito’s opinion in 
Tam attacking the disparagement clause may have been “about thwarting political correctness. . . . This 
anti-PC motivation is evident when Alito derisively dubs the statute ‘a happy-talk clause and when he 
attacks the government’s argument that it ‘has an interest in preventing speech expressing ideas that 
offend,’” and adding that “Alito’s First Amendment stance in Tam may not cut across the free-speech 
playing field”).  
 91. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2307 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 92. Id. at 2311 n.5 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 93. Id. at 2308. 
 94. See id. at 2297 (majority opinion) (noting that “registration gives trademark owners valuable 
benefits.  For example, registration constitutes ‘prima facie evidence’ of the mark’s validity. . . .  And 
registration serves as ‘constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership,’ which forecloses some 
defenses in infringement actions” (citation omitted)). 
CALVERT, IANCU V. BRUNETTI’S IMPACT ON FIRST AMENDMENT LAW, 43 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 37 (2019) 
52 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [43:1 
prohibit, limit, or otherwise censor their use when registration either is denied by the 
PTO or is not sought by a user.95  In brief, PTO registration confers government 
benefits; its denial, however, neither thwarts free expression nor curbs a mark’s use.96 
Chief Justice Roberts crisply explained this proposition in Brunetti, writing in his 
separate opinion that whether marks: 
can be registered does not affect the extent to which their owners may use them in 
commerce to identify goods.  No speech is being restricted; no one is being punished.  
The owners of such marks are merely denied certain additional benefits associated with 
federal trademark registration.  The Government, meanwhile, has an interest in not 
associating itself with trademarks whose content is obscene, vulgar, or profane.  The 
First Amendment protects the freedom of speech; it does not require the Government 
to give aid and comfort to those using obscene, vulgar, and profane modes of 
expression.97 
Justice Breyer emphasized a similar point.  Denial of registration by the PTO 
works only minor harm to First Amendment speech interests because businesses 
remain “free to use highly vulgar or obscene words on their products, and even to 
use such words directly next to other registered marks.  Indeed, a business owner 
might even use a vulgar word as a trademark, provided that he or she is willing to 
forgo the benefits of registration.”98 
Buttressing the proposition that PTO regulation of what he called “highly vulgar 
or obscene trademarks” was warranted, Breyer stressed that trademark law already 
is “highly regulated” in order to help consumers identify the source or origin of goods 
and services.99  For Breyer, this carefully focused mission, when coupled with the 
regulation-intensive nature of federal trademark law, puts applicants like Erik 
Brunetti on notice that they “should not expect complete freedom to say what [they 
want], but should instead expect linguistic regulation.”100 
Breyer’s thesis that trademark law is a highly regulated legal space and that speech 
restrictions are therefore more permissible and expected taps into the point addressed 
earlier that the Court has greenlighted government regulation of indecent speech 
within the FCC’s regulatory province of over-the-air broadcasting.101  As with 
federal trademark applicants, broadcasters are “accustomed to living in a highly 
regulated environment”102 and there is “history of extensive government regulation 
 
 95. See id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that federal 
trademark law “leaves businesses free to use highly vulgar or obscene words on their products, and even 
to use such words directly next to other registered marks,” and adding that “a business owner might even 
use a vulgar word as a trademark, provided that he or she is willing to forgo the benefits of registration”); 
id. at 2316 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Regardless of whether a trademark 
is registered, it can be used, owned, and enforced against would-be infringers.”). 
 96. See id. at 2308 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing the federal 
trademark registration system as “a beneficial governmental initiative”). 
 97. Id. at 2303–04 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 98. Id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id.  
 101. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text (addressing Pacifica Foundation). 
 102. Joshua N. Pila, They’re Already Regulating the Internet?, 29 COMM. LAWYER 12, 13 (2012). 
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of the broadcast medium.”103  First and foremost, broadcasters must agree to serve 
the public interest in order to be conferred the benefit of a license affording them the 
right to speak to the public.104  Renewal of licenses after eight years by the FCC is 
also contingent upon serving the public interest.105  And although the FCC cannot 
censor the speech of broadcasters in advance of publication,106 Congress has given 
the agency statutory authority to fine broadcasters—and even to revoke their 
licenses107—if they air obscene, indecent, or profane content,108 under the premise 
that such content is not in the public interest.109  Additionally, after Pacifica 
Foundation, broadcasters have a clear expectation that their speech can be more 
closely restricted than that conveyed on other forms of media.110  The indecency ban 
simply is “[o]ne of the burdens that licensees shoulder” in exchange for receiving the 
government-conferred benefit of a license.111  Bridging domains, government 
regulation of offensive speech is more easily understood in the tightly regulated 
spaces of both trademark law by the PTO and broadcasting by the FCC than it is in 
other realms that are not as heavily regulated. 
Furthermore, as Justice Sotomayor pointed out, trademark registration provides a 
considerably different context for analyzing the regulation of offensive speech than 
does the one the Court confronted when it safeguarded the phrase “Fuck the Draft” 
in Cohen v. California, as described earlier.112  While Cohen bestowed First 
Amendment protection on “the mother of all words commonly labeled lewd or 
profane,” Sotomayor attempted to cabin and confine Cohen’s sweep.113  Specifically, 
she stressed that Cohen involved criminal punishment of offensive expression, a far 
cry from denying the government-granted benefits that flow from PTO 
registration.114  Additionally, Sotomayor emphasized that Cohen was not a case 
about viewpoint discrimination115—in stark contrast, recall here that the six-justice 
 
 103. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997). 
 104. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (2017). 
 105. Id. § 307(c)(1). 
 106. Id. § 326. 
 107. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 506 (2009) (noting that “Congress has 
given the Commission various means of enforcing the indecency ban, including civil fines . . . and license 
revocations or the denial of license renewals” (citation omitted)). 
 108. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2018). 
 109. Importantly, the Supreme Court in 2012 made it clear to the FCC that it was “free to modify its 
current indecency policy in light of its determination of the public interest and applicable legal 
requirements.”  FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 259 (2012).   
 110. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (noting that “of all forms of communication, 
it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment protection”). 
 111. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 506 (2009). 
 112. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); see also supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
 113. Rodney A. Smolla, Categories, Tiers of Review, and the Roiling Sea of Free Speech Doctrine 
and Principle: A Methodological Critique of United States v. Alvarez, 76 ALB. L. REV. 499, 501 (2012). 
 114. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2314 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“Cohen arose in the criminal context:  Cohen had been arrested and imprisoned under 
a California criminal statute targeting disturbances of the peace because he was ‘wearing a jacket bearing 
the words ‘F[***] the Draft.’” (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16)). 
 115.  Sotomayor explained that the Court in Cohen: 
did not suggest that the State had targeted Cohen to suppress his view itself (i.e., his sharp distaste 
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majority in Brunetti concluded that viewpoint discrimination was fatally present for 
both the “immoral” and “scandalous” provisions—but rather one that suggests “a 
plain, blanket restriction on profanity (regardless of the idea to which it is attached) 
is a viewpoint-neutral form of content discrimination.”116  Or, as the author of this 
Article wrote in 2019, prior to the Court’s ruling in Brunetti but in Tam’s aftermath: 
“[F]uck” is what offended in Cohen, not Cohen’s viewpoint about conscription. “Fuck” 
is not a viewpoint.  It is not even a viewpoint about sex.  It is, instead, a word that 
violates certain norms of civil discourse in polite society and thus gives offense to some 
people by its very utterance.117 
Reinforcing the notion that “fuck” is not a viewpoint, Justice Breyer wrote in 
Brunetti that highly vulgar “words do not typically convey any particular 
viewpoint.”118  In brief, there is a vast legal gulf of contextual differences between, 
on the one hand, protecting the right to utter “fuck” emotively while expressing 
political dissent (as in Cohen) and, on the other hand, denying federal trademark 
registration to deploy “FUCT” as a source identifier for a clothing brand (as in 
Brunetti).  While Cohen is one of the Supreme Court’s paramount free expression 
decisions,119 its reach is neither infinite nor elastically all-encompassing when it 
comes to shielding offensive expression from censorship and restriction.  This is 
particularly true in non-criminal scenarios (such as trademark law in Brunetti) that 
already feature a high level of federal regulation and where government action—in 
Brunetti, the act of rejecting registration—does not bar the use of any speech, but 
simply impedes the receipt of government-conferred benefits.120 
3. How the Justices Would Craft a Ban on Offensive Marks 
With these justifications for regulating offensive marks in mind, the next issue is 
definitional:  What constitutes a registration-deniable offensive mark?  How, in other 
words, might Congress—drawing insight from the five opinions in Brunetti—draft a 
more constitutionally sound statute for the PTO to block the registration of offensive 
marks?  Although mild disagreement exists among their stances, the justices’ broad 
theme is this:  Registration of offensive marks may be barred if the PTO focuses 
solely on obscene, vulgar, or profane modes of expressing ideas, not on the ideas 
 
for the draft), such that it would have accepted an equally colorful statement of praise for the draft 
(or hostility toward war protesters).  Rather, the Court suggested that the State had simply engaged 
in what later courts would more precisely call viewpoint-neutral content discrimination . . . 
Id. at 2314–15. 
 116. Id. at 2315. 
 117. Clay Calvert, Merging Offensive-Speech Cases with Viewpoint-Discrimination Principles: The 
Immediate Impact of Matal v. Tam on Two Strands of First Amendment Jurisprudence, 27 WM. & MARY 
BILL OF RTS. J. 829, 836 (2019) [hereinafter Calvert, Merging]. 
 118. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2306 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 119. See Clay Calvert, Revisiting the Right to Offend Forty Years After Cohen v. California: One 
Case’s Legacy on First Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 51 (2011) (addressing 
how some scholars have lauded Cohen). 
 120. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2306 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting 
that “the field at issue here, trademark law, is a highly regulated one with a specialized mission”). 
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themselves.  More simply, offense caused by how an idea is expressed is regulatable, 
not the idea itself. 
How might such an offensive-mode-of-expression rule play out if implemented 
by the PTO?  Several hypotheticals—albeit ones not posed by the justices in 
Brunetti—suggest the possibilities.  For example, one presumably could register 
“nonsense” as part of the name mark for a hypothetical business, such as Nonsense 
Pies, to express the idea that something is untrue, foolish, or deceptive.  One 
presumably could not, however, register “bullshit” as a mark in place of “nonsense” 
for the same business—now called Bullshit Pies—because “bullshit” might be 
perceived as a vulgar or profane mode of conveying the underlying idea of 
untruthfulness or foolishness.  Closer to the facts in Brunetti, one seemingly could 
register “Messed Up Clothing” or “Crazy Clothing,” but not “Fucked Up Clothing” 
because “fucked up” is a profane or vulgar mode of expressing the underlying idea 
of a messed up or crazy state.  Or, harkening back nearly fifty years to Cohen v. 
California,121 a hypothetically entrepreneurial Paul Robert Cohen could start a 
fashion business and register with the PTO “The Draft is Wrong Jackets,” but not 
“Fuck the Draft Jackets,” because the latter is a vulgar mode of expressing the 
former’s idea that the draft is misguided, ill-advised, or—more bluntly, but not 
vulgarly—stupid. 
With those hypotheticals in mind, here is how such a regulatory approach 
ostensibly becomes viable, based on the totality of the Brunetti opinions.  In the 
process, this Article provides context for analyzing and understanding the justices’ 
specific proposals, and it identifies the proposals’ seeming strengths and weaknesses. 
a.  Justice Kagan and the Majority Opinion 
Justice Kagan was clear that her majority opinion said “nothing at all about a 
statute that covers only” those “marks that offend by their mode of 
expression,” including “lewd, sexually explicit, and profane” ones.122  In brief, she 
left open the possibility that such a statute might pass constitutional muster.  Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, and Breyer, in turn, exploited this 
regulatory opening by plumbing possibilities for how an offensive-mode-of-
expression statute might be carefully crafted.  Their views are described next. 
b. Chief Justice Roberts’s Opinion 
The solution for the Chief Justice was to define the extant statutory term 
“scandalous” to encompass “only marks that offend because of their mode of 
expression—marks that are obscene, vulgar, or profane.”123  Of this three-pronged 
approach, banning registration of the first category—obscene marks—poses no First 
Amendment problems.  That is because the Supreme Court long ago held that 
 
 121. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text (addressing Cohen). 
 122. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2302 n.* [Note:  This is an unnumbered footnote that is designated only 
by an asterisk]. 
 123. Id. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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obscenity, as defined by the Court,124 is not protected by the First Amendment.125 
But what about the second and third categories—vulgar and profane marks?  
Roberts, unfortunately, proffered no definition for either term.  He stressed, however, 
that denying registration to such marks, along with obscene ones, “does not offend 
the First Amendment.”126  That is the case, Roberts reasoned, for two related reasons:  
(1) blocking their registration does not stop one from using them; and (2) the First 
Amendment does not require the PTO “to give aid and comfort to those using” 
them.127  In other words, the First Amendment is not abridged when Erik Brunetti 
can still speak freely to the public through an offensive mark and is merely deprived 
of the government-created benefits that would flow from its registration.  The First 
Amendment, in brief, does not require the PTO to make a decision that bestows upon 
Brunetti perks above and beyond his simple right to speak. 
By way of comparison, the Court held more than thirty years ago in City of Renton 
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. that the First Amendment does not require a municipality, 
when adopting a zoning ordinance for sexually oriented businesses (“SOBs”), to 
grant SOBs economically favorable locations or ones where it is inexpensive to 
operate.128  As the Court reasoned in Renton, “we have never suggested that the First 
Amendment compels the Government to ensure that adult theaters, or any other kinds 
of speech-related businesses for that matter, will be able to obtain sites at bargain 
prices.”129  It added that the fact that SOBs “must fend for themselves in the real 
estate market, on an equal footing with other prospective purchasers and lessees, does 
not give rise to a First Amendment violation.”130  In other words, so long as SOBs 
are allowed to speak—so long as they are not completely zoned out of a municipality 
and they have a reasonable opportunity to convey their sexually explicit speech to 
the public131—no First Amendment violation arises simply because they are deprived 
of the economic benefits that would have flowed if the government had adopted a 
more fiscally friendly zoning law.  Similarly, so long as holders of vulgar or profane 
marks are permitted to use them, even after the PTO rebuffs registration, then no 
First Amendment violation occurs simply because they are denied government-
conferred benefits emanating from registration. 
Contextualized more broadly, the notion that the First Amendment is not violated 
by denying receipt of government benefits comports with the view that the First 
 
 124. The three-part test to determine if speech is obscene and thus beyond the purview of First 
Amendment protection entails considering whether:  (1) an average person, applying contemporary 
community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (2) the 
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law; and (3) the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value.  Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).   
 125. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 126. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 127. Id.  
 128. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986)  
 129. Id.  
 130. Id.  
 131. See id. (“In our view, the First Amendment requires only that Renton refrain from effectively 
denying respondents a reasonable opportunity to open and operate an adult theater within the city, and the 
ordinance before us easily meets this requirement.”). 
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Amendment merely extends negative rights against government censorship of 
speech, not positive ones requiring the government to help promote speech.132  Under 
this conception of negative rights, the First Amendment only provides “freedom from 
government action.  Affirmative or positive liberties are freedoms to particular 
outcomes, and sometimes require government action to effectuate.”133  The First 
Amendment, indeed, functions as a negative liberty in the trademark realm under 
Roberts’s position.  That is because it prevents the PTO from stopping people from 
using offensive marks; denial of registration, as noted above, does not thwart their 
use.134  The PTO, however, has no affirmative duty to extend a positive right to 
register a mark and, in turn, to grant its user benefits under federal trademark law.  
Bluntly put, Erik Brunetti possesses a negative right of free speech barring the PTO 
from stopping him from using a mark; conversely, he lacks a positive right to receive 
government registration for that mark and the fiscal advantages it brings. 
c. Justice Alito’s Opinion 
Although Justice Alito did not use the phrase “mode of expression” or a variant 
thereof in his solo concurrence, he implied that this tack provides a path forward.  He 
did this by suggesting that Congress should draft a “more carefully focused statute 
that precludes the registration of marks containing vulgar terms that play no real part 
in the expression of ideas.”135  As the two emphasized parts of that quotation 
collectively indicate, a revised statute should focus on certain vulgar terms rather 
than on the expression of ideas.  In other words, it is how an idea is phrased—
specifically, by using a word like “FUCT” that itself “is not needed to express any 
idea” and, instead, conveys only what Alito called “emotion”—that permits denial 
of trademark registration without raising constitutional concerns.136  This seems 
strikingly consistent with an approach focusing on the mode of expression, not the 
conveyance of ideas. 
 
 132. See Mary Anne Franks, Fearless Speech, 17 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 294, 333 (2018) (noting 
that “the First Amendment on its face provides a narrow and negative right of free speech” that, when 
literally interpreted, “only prohibits the creation of federal laws—and after incorporation, state laws—that 
infringe upon the freedom of speech”); Keith Werhan, The Classical Athenian Ancestry of American 
Freedom of Speech, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 293, 297 (2008) (noting that the First Amendment’s orientation 
to free expression “is negative,” not positive, because the amendment’s language “negates considerable 
governmental authority to interfere with an individual’s freedom of speech, but it imposes few positive 
obligations on the government to facilitate free speech”); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects 
of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 410 
(1990) (describing the interpretation under which “the Constitution in general . . . primarily provide[s] 
negative rights, which require the government to refrain from certain conduct, as opposed to positive 
rights, which impose affirmative duties on the government to take actions . . . to meet the needs of certain 
citizens”). 
 133. Marvin Ammori, First Amendment Architecture, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 1, 14 (2012). 
 134. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 135. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2303 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 136. Id.  
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d. Justice Sotomayor’s Opinion 
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer, delivered the most comprehensive 
and specific explication of an offensive-mode-of-expression regulation the PTO 
could enforce to bar registration of offensive marks.  She, like Chief Justice 
Roberts,137 narrowly defined “scandalous” to encompass “only obscenity, vulgarity, 
and profanity.”138  Although Sotomayor acknowledged this is a content-based 
regulation, she emphasized it is viewpoint-neutral because it regulates “offensiveness 
in the mode of communication rather than the idea” and “apart from any particular 
message.”139  This means that it escapes the lethal viewpoint-discrimination 
designation that, for the six-justice majority, sealed the fate of both the “immoral” 
and “scandalous” provisions.140 
How does Sotomayor define vulgarity and profanity?  Although not offering a 
definitive list of vulgar and profane words, she explained that they consist of 
shocking or extremely offensive terms that fall among “the small group of lewd 
words or ‘swear’ words that cause a visceral reaction, that are not commonly used 
around children, and that are prohibited in comparable settings.”141  Something 
potentially significant about this—and something addressed later in greater 
detail142—is that Sotomayor favorably cited the Federal Communications 
Commission’s statutory authority over profane language in support of her 
definition.143  This means Brunetti might well breathe new life into the FCC’s 
currently lax enforcement of its own profanity ban by emboldening that agency to 
enforce it more vigorously.  In other words, if a Supreme Court justice in 2019 
forcefully calls for one federal agency (the PTO) to enforce a ban on registering 
profane trademarks, then another federal agency (the FCC) should sense implicit 
support from at least some members of the Court for it to punish broadcasters who 
transmit profanity on the public airwaves. 
Additionally, Sotomayor cited the Court’s holding in Pacifica Foundation, 
described earlier, to support her definition.144  Specifically, she noted that the FCC’s 
objection there was not about a viewpoint expressed by comedian George Carlin, but 
rather regarded the way he expressed his views.145  Perhaps, then, Sotomayor’s 
definition, sub silentio, is confined to the seven words in Carlin’s monologue that 
 
 137. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (setting forth Roberts’s saving definition of 
“scandalous”). 
 138. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2308 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 139. See id. at 2310, 2314 (“A restriction on trademarks featuring obscenity, vulgarity, or profanity 
is similarly viewpoint neutral, though it is naturally content-based.”). 
 140. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (noting how the Brunetti majority found that both 
provisions constitute viewpoint-based regulations of speech). 
 141. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2311 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  She cited 
a dictionary definition of “scandalous” in support of this limiting language.  Id. at 2309. 
 142. See infra Part III. 
 143. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2311 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also 
18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2018) (allowing the FCC to fine broadcasters for airing “obscene, indecent, or profane 
language”). 
 144. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text (addressing Pacifica Foundation). 
 145. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2311 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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triggered the FCCs wrath.146 
Sotomayor’s effort to confine the meaning of vulgarity and profanity to words 
“not commonly used around children” actually harkens back to a more paternalistic, 
less egalitarian era when states banned the use of certain language in front of women 
and children.147  Perhaps more prominently, the California statute at issue in Cohen 
v. California banned, among multiple other things, the “use [of] any vulgar, profane, 
or indecent language within the presence or hearing of women or children.”148  
Today, that same statute omits this language.149  A Michigan appellate court in 2002 
declared a similar statute that criminalized the “use [of] any indecent, immoral, 
obscene, vulgar or insulting language in the presence or hearing of any woman or 
child” unconstitutionally vague.150  This statute was later repealed by a 2015 bill.151 
In a decidedly nebulous fashion, Sotomayor added that “[e]veryone can think of 
a small number of words (including the apparent homonym of Brunetti’s mark) that 
would . . . plainly qualify.”152  The subjectivity and ambiguity of this proposition 
harkens back more than a half-century to Justice Potter Stewart’s famous quip 
throwing in the metaphorical towel on defining obscenity:  “I know it when I see 
it.”153  The twist for Sotomayor in Brunetti simply is that she—and apparently 
everyone, in her estimation—knows vulgarity and profanity when they really think 
about it. 
In brief, Sotomayor provided a starting point for defining vulgarity and profanity.  
Greater definitional clarity, however, is probably needed for a revised statute 
targeting vulgarity and profanity to survive a void-for-vagueness challenge.154  As 
the Supreme Court described that doctrine when discussing the rules governing 
another federal regulatory regime—namely, the FCC’s enforcement of its anti-
indecency policies—principles of due process and fair notice require “the 
invalidation of laws that are impermissibly vague.”155 
For example, defining vulgarity—one of the three categories of offensive modes 
of expression, along with obscenity and profanity, that Sotomayor would allow the 
PTO to police—seems particularly problematic.  That is so in light of the Court’s 
 
 146. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 751 (1978) (quoting the words used by Carlin that 
he playfully suggested were “the ones that will curve your spine, grow hair on your hands and . . . maybe, 
even bring us, God help us, peace without honor . . . um, and a bourbon”). 
 147. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2311 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 148. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 n.1 (1971). 
 149. CAL. PENAL CODE § 415 (2019). 
 150. Michigan v. Boomer, 655 N.W.2d 255, 257 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002). 
 151. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.337 (2002), repealed by PUB. ACTS 2015, No. 210, § 1(f), 
effective Mar. 14, 2016. 
 152. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2311 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 153. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 154. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (observing that a law is void for 
vagueness if it “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so 
standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement”); see also Frank D. 
LoMonte, Fouling the First Amendment: Why Colleges Can’t, and Shouldn’t, Control Student Athletes’ 
Speech on Social Media, 9 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 6–7 (2014) (explaining that a law “may be declared void 
for vagueness if it fails to give intelligible notice of the behavior that will result in penalties”). 
 155. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012). 
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wry but sagacious observation in Cohen v. California that “one man’s vulgarity is 
another’s lyric” and its contention that “governmental officials cannot make 
principled distinctions in this area.”156  Thus, if Congress chooses to redraft the 
statute to deny registration for marks that are vulgar due to their mode of expression, 
it would face an exceedingly difficult task in pinning down a clear, precise meaning 
for “vulgar.” 
Definitional difficulties aside, however, perhaps the true twin hallmarks of Justice 
Sotomayor’s position are her attempts to:  (1) doctrinally untangle and separate two 
distinct modes of judicial analysis: one for examining instances of offense based 
upon the substantive viewpoint conveyed (offensive viewpoints) and one for 
reviewing instances of offense arising from the manner of expressing a viewpoint 
(offensive modes of expression); and (2) reframe the statutory definition of 
“scandalous” at issue in Brunetti so as to make it fit within the latter category of 
analysis rather than the former, thereby sparing it (in her view, at least, and should 
Congress now redraft it as she recommends) from certain doom as a viewpoint-based 
regulation, while giving it a fighting chance to pass constitutional muster. 
In Tam, Justice Alito arguably conflated the two strands of judicial analysis when 
he bluntly proclaimed that “[g]iving offense is a viewpoint.”157  This, as the author 
of this Article argued prior to the Court’s decision in Brunetti, is “oversimplistic.”158  
A more nuanced position is that “giving offense sometimes may be a viewpoint, but 
giving offense is not always a viewpoint.”159  In a nutshell, the word “fuck,” which 
was at issue in both Cohen160 and Pacifica Foundation,161 does not give offense in 
those disputes because it expresses a viewpoint about the draft or some other topic, 
but “because its usage ‘is a cultural taboo’ in terms of how one should speak or talk, 
and thus it causes offense.”162  Put slightly differently, “while viewpoint-
discrimination cases are about what substantive idea is being said and censored, 
offensive-speech cases are about the emotional impact (rather than the cognitive 
meaning) of speech.”163  Justice Sotomayor tapped into the notion of “emotional 
impact” in Brunetti, writing that the PTO should have power over a small group of 
words that “cause a visceral reaction.”164 
Even if Congress fails to draft a new statute granting the PTO authority to bar 
registration for marks that offend due to their mode of expression, Justice Sotomayor 
deserves high praise for her Brunetti opinion.  She clarified that there is a doctrinal 
distinction between cases centering on viewpoint-based discrimination and those 
 
 156. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). 
 157. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017). 
 158. Calvert, Merging, supra note 117, at 837. 
 159. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 160. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text (addressing Cohen). 
 161. “Fuck” was one of the seven words in the George Carlin monologue at issue in Pacifica 
Foundation).  See supra note 146. 
 162. Calvert, Merging, supra note 117, at 834 (quoting Christopher Fairman, Fuck, 28 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1711, 1722 (2007)). 
 163. Id. at 836 (emphasis in original). 
 164. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2311 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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pivoting on words that give offense regardless of a viewpoint.  Justice Alito’s 
sweeping assertion in Tam that “[g]iving offense is a viewpoint”165 muddled the two 
doctrinal strands of cases;166 Justice Sotomayor’s opinion in Brunetti halts that 
confusion. 
Finally, and to lend long-standing doctrinal support to her view, Sotomayor’s 
mode-of-expression logic for barring registration of offensive marks taps into the 
reasoning behind the Court’s fighting words carve-out from First Amendment 
protection.167  Specifically, as Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in the cross-burning case 
of R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, “the reason why fighting words are categorically 
excluded from the protection of the First Amendment is not that their content 
communicates any particular idea, but that their content embodies a particularly 
intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode of expressing whatever idea the speaker 
wishes to convey.”168  In other words, the underlying “ideas conveyed by fighting 
words are constitutionally protected.”169  This is significant because if fighting words 
are punishable due to a speaker’s use of a mode of expression deemed intolerable 
and socially unnecessary, as Justice Scalia put it in R.A.V.,170 then the PTO should 
possess the authority to deny registration for marks whose mode of expression is 
similarly intolerable and socially unnecessary when it comes to helping consumers 
distinguish between the source or origin of goods or services. 
e. Justice Breyer’s Opinion 
Although Justice Breyer joined Justice Sotomayor’s opinion,171 he also wrote 
separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part.172  As this Article discusses later 
in Section A of Part II, a large chunk of Breyer’s opinion attacks the Court’s 
traditional methodology in free speech cases and extols the virtues of 
proportionality.173  Part of his opinion, however, articulates a slightly different 
conception of the marks for which he believes the PTO can deny registration without 
violating the First Amendment. 
In particular, Breyer averred that the PTO should be able to refuse registration for 
marks that are “highly vulgar or obscene”174 by interpreting the statutory word 
“scandalous” in such a narrow and limiting fashion.175  As he explained, the 
 
 165. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017). 
 166. Calvert, Merging, supra note 117, at 842. 
 167. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2314 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 
the Court’s fighting words doctrine to support the idea that a mode-of-expression classification may be 
independent from any viewpoint expressed). 
 168. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 393 (1992) (emphasis in original). 
 169. Kindaka J. Sanders, Defending the Spirit: The Right to Self-Defense Against Psychological 
Assault, 19 NEV. L.J. 228, 246 (2018). 
 170. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393. 
 171. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2308 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting 
that Breyer joined Sotomayor’s opinion). 
 172. See id. at 2304 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 173. See infra Part II.A. 
 174. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2307 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 175. See id. at 2304 (expressing his agreement “with Justice Sotomayor that, for the reasons she 
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government has “at least a reasonable interest in ensuring that it is not involved in 
promoting highly vulgar or obscene speech, and that it will not be associated with 
such speech.”176 
Three items immediately stand out when his position is compared to the calls of 
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Alito for the sorts of marks that 
should be denied registration.  Roberts and Sotomayor, it will be recalled, both 
argued that the PTO needs authority to rebuff registration for obscene, vulgar, or 
profane marks that cause offense due to their mode of expression.177  Justice Alito, 
as noted earlier, focused more narrowly on vulgar marks, not mentioning obscene or 
profane ones.178  The first item, then, is one of consistency among Breyer, Roberts, 
Alito, and Sotomayor:  They all would vest the PTO with authority over vulgar 
marks.  The second point, conversely, is one of contrast; Breyer is the only justice to 
modify vulgar with the adverb “highly.”  Finally, the third item is another one of 
contrast:  Breyer and Alito omit the term “profanity,” while Roberts and Sotomayor 
adopt it. 
Are these two distinctions significant?  First, Breyer’s effort to dial up the level 
of vulgarity necessary to warrant PTO denial of registration, via the modifier 
“highly,” carries both pros and cons.  On the positive side, at least from a pro-free- 
speech perspective, it reins in the PTO’s discretion to determine which marks may 
be denied registration—namely, only those that are highly vulgar.  In fact, this 
attempt to restrain the scope of vulgarity is consistent with Justice Sotomayor’s 
position.  While she did not modify “vulgar” with the adverb “highly,” Sotomayor 
explained that the statutory term “scandalous,” which she narrowed in construction 
to include only obscene, vulgar, and profane marks, swept up only those vulgar 
marks that are shocking and extremely offensive.179  In brief, Breyer’s use of 
“highly” approximates Sotomayor’s use of “extremely” when it comes to defining 
the ambit of vulgarity, with both jurists limiting regulatable vulgarity to some 
unspecified upper stratum. 
On the negative side, the adverb “highly” itself seems imprecise and subjective.  
While “highly” clearly suggests a greater level of vulgarity beyond what would be, 
by contrast, “moderately” vulgar, the threshold for clearing “highly” might vary from 
person to person based upon, perhaps, how much vulgarity she is used to hearing or 
 
gives, we should interpret the word ‘scandalous’ in the present statute to refer only to certain highly 
‘vulgar’ or ‘obscene’ modes of expression”). 
 176. Id. at 2307 (emphasis added). 
 177. See id. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (opining that “refusing 
registration to obscene, vulgar, or profane marks does not offend the First Amendment”); id. at 2313 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Adopting a narrow construction for the word 
“scandalous”—interpreting it to regulate only obscenity, vulgarity, and profanity—would save it from 
unconstitutionality.”). 
 178. See id. at 2303 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Our decision does not prevent Congress from adopting 
a more carefully focused statute that precludes the registration of marks containing vulgar terms that play 
no real part in the expression of ideas.” (emphasis added)). 
 179. See id. at 2311 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Of course, 
‘scandalous’ offers its own limiting principle:  if a word, though not exactly polite, cannot be said to be 
‘scandalous’—e.g., ‘shocking’ or ‘extremely offensive,’ 8 CENTURY DICTIONARY 5374—it is clearly not 
the kind of vulgarity or profanity that Congress intended to target.”). 
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reading.  In brief, it might be that the more prudish and proper a person is, the more 
likely she is to regard a mark as highly vulgar, whereas someone who is comfortable 
with swearing would be less likely to find the same mark highly vulgar.  One 
solution, of course, is to deploy a fictional average person test:  Would an average 
person deem the vulgarity highly offensive?  For example, the Supreme Court uses 
an average-person standard—in particular, an average-adult test—in the realm of 
obscenity law.180  The Court thus seemingly would be comfortable with Congress 
embracing an average-person test for high vulgarity in the trademark context. 
In terms of the second difference, Breyer’s (like Alito’s) omission of “profanity” 
streamlines the definition, thereby helping Congress (should it redraft the statute) by 
eliminating another term that, like “vulgarity,” is fraught with definitional 
ambiguities and ripe for a void-for-vagueness challenge.  For instance, and as 
described in Part III,181 the Federal Communications Commission rather cryptically 
defines profanity as “‘grossly offensive’ language that is considered a public 
nuisance.”182  Whether the FCC’s modification of the vague term “offensive” with 
the adverb “grossly” clarifies anything about what is profane is debatable,183 but it is 
somewhat akin to Breyer modifying “vulgar” with “highly” to limit its scope by 
heightening the degree of vulgarity.184  Ultimately, as one scholarly article notes in 
reviewing the FCC’s regulation of profanity, “[t]he term ‘profane language’ admits 
no easy definition, let alone general agreement regarding its place in American 
society and the extent to which the government should attempt to regulate it.”185 
Whether “profanity” carries a different meaning from “vulgarity” today or 
whether they are duplicative is another issue Congress would need to tackle were it 
to adopt the approach of Roberts and Sotomayor in limiting the meaning of 
“scandalous” to modes of expression that cause offense because they are obscene, 
vulgar, or profane.  Jettisoning the term “profane,” by contrast, renders the benefit of 
 
 180. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973) (noting that the “primary concern” of having a 
jury apply the average-person standard for obscenity is that “so far as material is not aimed at a deviant 
group, it will be judged by its impact on an average person, rather than a particularly susceptible or 
sensitive person”); see also Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 300 (1978) (observing that “the 
community includes all adults who constitute it, and a jury can consider them all in determining relevant 
community standards”); ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that “Miller applied 
such standards as related to the average adult”). 
 181. See infra Part III (addressing whether Brunetti might embolden the Federal Communications 
Commission to enforce its statutory power over profane language on the broadcast airwaves). 
 182. Consumer Guide: Obscene, Indecent and Profane Broadcasts, FCC, https://perma.cc/28LK-
EK53 (last visited Oct. 2, 2019). 
 183. See Clay Calvert, The FCC and Profane Language: The Lugubrious Legacy of a Moral Panic 
and a Grossly Offensive Definition That Must be Jettisoned, 17 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 147, 173–74 (2018) 
(calling it “hard to fathom how using the word ‘grossly’ to modify ‘offensive’ adds clarity for a 
broadcaster seeking guidance and fair notice on how to avoid a possible civil penalty for airing profane 
content,” and asserting that “[a]ll ‘grossly’ does is ratchet up the level of offensiveness, but to an 
unspecified and nebulous degree”). 
 184. See supra notes 174–176 and accompanying text (addressing Breyer’s use of the term “highly 
vulgar”). 
 185. Edward L. Carter, R. Trevor Hall & James C. Phillips, Broadcast Profanity and the “Right to 
Be Let Alone”: Can the FCC Regulate Non-Indecent Fleeting Expletives Under a Privacy Model?, 31 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 2 (2008). 
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simplifying Congress’s definitional task to explicating only one word (“vulgarity”), 
given that the Supreme Court already has defined “obscenity.”186 
In summary, all nine justices in Brunetti left open the possibility that the PTO 
could regulate marks that offend due solely to their mode of expression. Roberts, 
Sotomayor, and Breyer fleshed out what such a mode-of-expression definition might 
look like were Congress to draft a new statute adopting their efforts to more precisely 
construe “scandalous,” as used in the statute the Brunetti majority struck down.  
Additionally, Justice Alito, although unwilling to provide such a narrowing 
construction to save the term “scandalous,”187 suggested that a more narrowly drafted 
statute targeting only vulgarity not conveying a substantive idea would be 
permissible.188  In total, four members of the Court telegraphed to Congress specific 
ways of resuscitating the PTO’s power over a narrow class of offensive marks.  This 
Part has critiqued those efforts and contextualized them within a framework of 
related First Amendment principles, doctrines, and cases. 
The next Part of this Article moves beyond these definitional issues to address 
Justice Breyer’s efforts in Brunetti to once again instantiate proportionality review 
into First Amendment jurisprudence.  Furthermore, the next Part also examines 
Justice Sotomayor’s contention that strict scrutiny need not apply to measure the 
constitutional validity of a mode-of-expression rule for offensive marks that would 
empower the PTO to bar their registration. 
II. OF PROPORTIONALITY AND SCRUTINY:  A CLOSER LOOK AT 
BRUNETTI 
This Part has two sections.  Section A concentrates on Justice Breyer’s articulation 
in Brunetti of his proportionality approach to First Amendment disputes and how he 
applied it to the facts of the case.  Section B examines Justice Sotomayor’s suggestion 
that an offensive-mode-of-expression regulation enforced by the PTO, although 
content-based, would not need to surmount strict scrutiny review to be constitutional.  
Viewed collectively, the opinions of Breyer and Sotomayor reveal that not all of the 
justices believe strict scrutiny presumptively applies simply because a statute is 
facially content-based.  This is particularly significant in light of the Court’s 2015 
ruling in Reed v. Town of Gilbert arguably suggesting otherwise.189   
 
 186. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (setting forth the Court’s three-part test for obscenity 
developed in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).  
 187. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2302–03 (Alito, J., concurring) (expressing his unwillingness 
to provide a saving construction for the statute by asserting that the law at issue “cannot be fixed without 
rewriting the statute” and adding that “we are not legislators and cannot substitute a new statute for the 
one now in force”). 
 188. See id. at 2303 (“Our decision does not prevent Congress from adopting a more carefully 
focused statute that precludes the registration of marks containing vulgar terms that play no real part in 
the expression of ideas.”). 
 189. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).  Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence 
Thomas opined that “[c]ontent-based laws—those that target speech based on its communicative 
content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they 
are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”  Id. at 2226.  He added that this means that 
facially content-based laws “are subject to strict scrutiny.” Id. at 2227.  For analysis of Justice Thomas’s 
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Furthermore, this Part contends that a carefully crafted offensive-mode-of-
expression rule that focuses only on the manner of expression provides an escape 
hatch from strict scrutiny because it evades the Court’s reasoning in Reed that 
“[g]overnment regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular 
speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.”190  In brief, 
as explored in Section B, an offensive-mode-of-expression rule applies regardless of 
the topics, ideas, or substantive messages being addressed. 
A. JUSTICE BREYER:  DOCTRINAL CATEGORIES, RULES OF THUMB AND 
PROPORTIONALITY 
It is somewhat safe to say, after reading Justice Breyer’s opinion in Brunetti, that 
he mildly objects to the Court’s decades-old approach to analyzing free speech cases.  
Actually, that is an understatement.  A more accurate conclusion is that Breyer, 
among all his high court colleagues,191 is the most willing to obliterate the Court’s 
 
opinion, see Dan V. Kozlowski & Derigan Silver, Measuring Reed’s Reach: Content Discrimination in 
the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 24 COMM. L. & POL’Y 191, 192 (2019) 
(noting that Thomas’s opinion “seemed to have the potential to throw many regulations into jeopardy and 
reshape First Amendment jurisprudence” because he “wrote in broad strokes, as if all content-based laws, 
even those that target less protected areas of speech such as commercial speech, should be subjected to 
strict scrutiny” and because Thomas opined that “that facial content discrimination cannot be saved with 
a benign purpose”) (emphasis in original). 
 190. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (emphasis added). 
 191. See Donald L. Beschle, Fake News, Deliberate Lies, and the First Amendment, 44 DAYTON L. 
REV. 209, 219 (2019) (describing Breyer as “the Court’s most frequent advocate of invoking a 
proportionality (or balancing) test in constitutional cases”); Mark Tushnet, Internet Exceptionalism: An 
Overview from General Constitutional Law, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1637, 1640 n.9 (2015) (“The 
primary expositor of proportionality analysis, including in connection with the First Amendment, is Justice 
Stephen Breyer.”). 
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traditional categorical-exclusion192 and labeling193 methodology.  He also is the most 
willing to jettison its tiers-of-scrutiny tack that typically pivots on a content-based 
versus content-neutral dichotomy194 for analyzing restrictions on speech that is 
presumptively protected by the First Amendment.195  Breyer would replace it all with 
 
 192. Under this approach, the Court embraces the notion that some categories of speech are either 
of such low value that restricting them does not raise any First Amendment concerns or, more recently, 
that there is a historical tradition of not protecting such speech.  See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (marking the start of this approach via the assertion that “[t]here are certain well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been 
thought to raise any Constitutional problem,” and adding that these categories include “the lewd and 
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words” which “are no essential part of 
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be 
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality”); United States v. 
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (asserting that whether a category of speech falls outside of First 
Amendment protection depends on whether it has “been historically unprotected”); see also Wayne 
Batchis, On the Categorical Approach to Free Speech – And the Protracted Failure to Delimit the True 
Threats Exception to the First Amendment, 37 PACE L. REV. 1, 2 (2016) (noting that the Court’s “famous 
dictum” from its ruling in Chaplinsky “is responsible for establishing this system of classification”); Chad 
Flanders, A Half-Hearted Defense of the Categorical Approach, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1389, 1393 (2018) 
(noting that “the list of categorical exceptions to First Amendment protection” gives rise to “the name, the 
‘categorical approach’”); Gregory P. Magarian, The Marrow of Tradition: The Roberts Court and 
Categorical First Amendment Speech Exclusions, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1339, 1342–43 (2015) 
(observing that “[t]he development of categorical speech exclusions stretches back to the beginning of 
First Amendment law,” and asserting that the Supreme Court’s 1942 decision in Chaplinsky “modeled the 
categorical approach to setting the First Amendment’s boundaries”).  
 193. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Our Shrinking First Amendment: On the Growing Problem of 
Reduced Access to Public Property for Speech Activity and Some Suggestions for a Better Way Forward, 
78 OHIO ST. L.J. 779, 795 (2017) (noting that labeling “speech as ‘political,’ ‘commercial,’ or ‘obscene’ 
often prefigures its protected or unprotected status under the First Amendment”). 
 194. Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment on the Tracks: Should Justice Breyer Be at the Switch?, 
89 MINN. L. REV. 1280, 1294 (2005) (“The use of the content-based/content-neutral distinction as a trigger 
for the level of scrutiny is entrenched in First Amendment doctrine.”). 
 195. Under the Court’s tiers-of-scrutiny approach in First Amendment speech cases, content-based 
regulations typically are subject to strict scrutiny review, while content-neutral regulations generally must 
survive intermediate scrutiny.  As Professor Genevieve Lakier explains it: 
The distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech is one of the most 
important in First Amendment law.  For decades now, the Supreme Court has insisted that content-
based laws—laws that restrict speech because of its ideas or messages or subject matter—are 
presumptively unconstitutional, and will be sustained only if they can satisfy strict scrutiny.  In 
contrast, content-neutral laws—laws that regulate speech for some reason other than its content—
are reviewed under a lesser, and often quite deferential, standard. 
Genevieve Lakier, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, and the Rise of the Anticlassificatory First 
Amendment, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 233.  See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Producing Speech, 56 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1029, 1062 (2015) (“It is of course familiar grounds in First Amendment jurisprudence that 
content-based laws are of greater constitutional concern than content-neutral laws.  For restrictions on 
speech itself, the doctrine imposes strict scrutiny on content-based laws and a relatively deferential form 
of intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral laws.”); see also Enrique Armijo, The “Ample Alternative 
Channels” Flaw in First Amendment Doctrine, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1657, 1691 (2016) (noting that 
“the content-based versus content-neutral distinction . . . governs Speech Clause doctrine”). 
  There are, however, some exceptions to the rule that content-based laws are subject to strict 
scrutiny.  For instance, statutes targeting truthful commercial speech for lawful goods and services are 
subject to a form of intermediate scrutiny review.  See Tamara R. Piety, Market Failure in the Marketplace 
of Ideas: Commercial Speech and the Problem that Won’t Go Away, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 181, 182 (2007) 
(observing that “the commercial speech doctrine creates a category of speech subject to intermediate 
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a more “free-form”196 proportionality framework adopted in Europe but generally 
not embraced in the United States.197 
Justice Breyer, as former Stanford Law School Dean Kathleen Sullivan observes, 
devotes greater attention “to consequences rather than categories” and “favors 
flexibility.”198  Indeed, Breyer’s penchant for flexibility and elasticity199 and his 
concomitant disdain of categories was front and center in Brunetti.  As he bluntly 
wrote there, the Court should treat its “speech-related categories not as outcome-
determinative rules, but instead as rules of thumb.”200  
It was not the first time Breyer had argued that the Court’s doctrinal categories 
are mere rules of thumb.  He did the same thing in both Reed v. Town of Gilbert201 
and Pleasant Grove City v. Summum.202  In the former case, he argued that “[t]he 
First Amendment requires greater judicial sensitivity both to the Amendment’s 
 
scrutiny under the First Amendment”); Judith Welch Wegner & Matthew Norchi, Regulating 
Panhandling: Reed and Beyond, 63 S.D. L. REV. 579, 593 (2019) (noting that “commercial speech 
generally only invokes intermediate scrutiny”). 
 196. See Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Voracious First Amendment: Alvarez and 
Knox in the Context of 2012 and Beyond, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 491, 497 (2013) (noting that Breyer tends 
to engage in a “free-form balancing approach”). 
 197. For the place of proportionality in European jurisprudence, see George A. Bermann, Taking 
Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
332, 387 (1994) (“Proportionality . . . has chiefly been regarded in the European Community, and in 
European public law more generally, as a principle of judicial review.”); Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo 
Porat, The Hidden Foreign Law Debate in Heller: The Proportionality Approach in American 
Constitutional Law, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 367, 380 (2009) (noting “the well-known European doctrine 
of proportionality”); Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law, 
102 AM. J. INT’L L. 715, 752 (2008) (“The principle of proportionality is deeply ingrained in the national 
jurisprudence of the civil law states of Europe, and this has affected the development of proportionality 
as an important legal precept both in European regional law and, more generally, in international law.”).  
For the lack of support for proportionality in the United States, see Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent 
Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening up the Conversation on “Proportionality,” 
Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 603 (1999) (noting that “U.S. constitutional law does 
not ordinarily and explicitly resort to the idea of proportionality as a measure of constitutionality”). 
 198. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Tribute to Justice Stephen G. Breyer, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 25, 
27 (2008). 
 199. See Benjamin Pomerance, An Elastic Amendment: Justice Stephen G. Breyer’s Fluid 
Conceptions of Freedom of Speech, 79 ALB. L. REV. 403, 507 (2016) (asserting that Breyer views the First 
Amendment as “an elastic amendment, expanding and contracting depending on the interests that each 
side asserted for the dispute currently before the Court”).   
 200. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2304 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 201. Breyer wrote in Reed that when it comes to analyzing cases that regulate specific types of 
content: 
The better approach is to generally treat content discrimination as a strong reason weighing against 
the constitutionality of a rule where a traditional public forum, or where viewpoint discrimination, 
is threatened, but elsewhere treat it as a rule of thumb, finding it a helpful, but not determinative 
legal tool, in an appropriate case, to determine the strength of a justification. 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2235 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  He 
added in Reed that “the category ‘content discrimination’ is better considered in many contexts, including 
here, as a rule of thumb, rather than as an automatic ‘strict scrutiny’ trigger, leading to almost certain legal 
condemnation.”  Id. at 2234 (emphasis added). 
 202. In Summum, Breyer contended “that the ‘government speech’ doctrine is a rule of thumb, not a 
rigid category.” City of Pleasant Grove v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 484 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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expressive objectives and to the public’s legitimate need for regulation than a simple 
recitation of categories, such as ‘content discrimination’ and ‘strict scrutiny,’ would 
permit.”203  In the latter, he contended that the Court, rather than “turn[ing] ‘free 
speech’ doctrine into a jurisprudence of labels,”204 should instead “ask whether a 
government action burdens speech disproportionately in light of the action’s 
tendency to further a legitimate government objective.”205 
It is the last Breyer quotation above from Summum that encapsulates his view of 
proportionality, which he reiterated in Brunetti.  In Brunetti, Breyer explicitly:  (1) 
rebuffed “existing outcome-determinative categories;”206 (2) engaged in 
“proportionality analysis;”207 and (3) called for the Court to “focus on the interests 
the First Amendment protects and ask a more basic proportionality question:  Does 
‘the regulation at issue wor[k] harm to First Amendment interests that is 
disproportionate in light of the relevant regulatory objectives’?”208 
A key principle for Breyer—focusing on the underlying interests and values that 
the First Amendment is intended to protect or, as he put it in Reed, on the First 
Amendment’s “expressive objectives”209—builds directly upon his dissent just one 
year earlier in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra.210  In 
Becerra, five conservative justices held that two compelled-disclosure requirements 
affecting crisis pregnancy centers in California likely violated their First Amendment 
speech rights.211  Authoring a dissent joined by fellow liberal-leaning Justices Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan, Breyer asserted that the 
majority’s suggestion “that heightened scrutiny applies to much economic and social 
legislation” simply because it is content-based is misguided.212  That is because, in 
Breyer’s view, these laws do not jeopardize “the true value of protecting freedom of 
 
 203. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2234 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 204. Summum, 555 U.S. at 484 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 205. Id.  
 206. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2306 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. (quoting Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2235–36 (Breyer, J., concurring)). 
 209. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring); see also 
Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2305 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that he “would appeal more often and more 
directly to the values the First Amendment seeks to protect” (emphasis added)). 
 210. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 211. As summed up by Justice Clarence Thomas in writing the majority opinion in Becerra on behalf 
of himself, Chief Justice John Roberts, and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch, 
the California statute required licensed crisis pregnancy centers to “notify women that California provides 
free or low-cost services, including abortions, and give them a phone number to call.”  Id. at 2368.  It also 
mandated that unlicensed crisis pregnancy centers disclose the fact that they are not, in fact, licensed by 
California to provide medical services.  Id.  The centers, which are pro-life organizations that aim to 
dissuade women from obtaining abortions, argued that these mandates violated their First Amendment 
right of free expression by compelling them to convey government-drafted messages that would alter their 
own pro-life message.  Id. at 2368–71.  The majority held that the centers were “likely to succeed on the 
merits of their claim.”  Id. at 2378. 
 212. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2382 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2380 (“Before turning to the 
specific law before us, I focus upon the general interpretation of the First Amendment that the majority 
says it applies.  It applies heightened scrutiny to the Act because the Act, in its view, is ‘content based.’” 
(quoting id. at 2371 (majority opinion))). 
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speech.”213  Acknowledging that the “true value[s]” include safeguarding both 
unpopular ideas and a marketplace of ideas where truth may win out, Breyer reasoned 
that the majority’s tack does “those First Amendment goals a serious disservice 
through dilution.”214  While not phrasing it in terms of proportionality, Breyer’s 
thesis in Becerra smacks of a proportionality approach:  Applying heightened 
scrutiny to “ordinary economic and social legislation”215 is misguided and 
unnecessary—it is, in other words, a disproportionately heavy-handed test—because 
the damage worked to core First Amendment interests from such legislation 
generally is minimal. 
Breyer’s proportionality approach thus first entails reviewing the speech interests 
at stake in any case and, specifically, whether a statute affects “values the First 
Amendment seeks to protect.”216  Put differently, the threshold issue for Breyer is 
whether a statute impacts important interests that the First Amendment is intended 
to protect.  The second step then considers whether the damage wrought to those 
speech interests—be they core First Amendment values or ones peripheral to that 
amendment’s purpose—is disproportionate when compared to the government’s 
interest in achieving its regulatory objectives by restricting speech.217 
Proportionality in First Amendment cases, which Justice Breyer asserts “involves 
balancing,”218 boils down to evaluating whether “statutes strike a reasonable balance 
between their speech-restricting and speech-enhancing consequences”219 or, in 
contrast, whether the “restrictions on speech . . . are disproportionate when measured 
against their corresponding . . . benefits.”220  More simply put by Professor Carmen 
Maye in a recent article, a law will pass constitutional muster if the interference with 
speech interests is “in proportion to the interests served” by that interference.221 
The presumptions in this balancing approach seem to be as follows:  (1) When a 
statute implicates core First Amendment interests and values, less incursion upon 
speech is allowed when serving a government’s regulatory objective; and, 
conversely, (2) when core First Amendment interests and values are not implicated 
by a statute, greater incursion upon speech is permissible to facilitate a government’s 
regulatory objective.  Parsed differently, whether statutory encroachment on speech 
 
 213. Id. at 2383. 
 214. Id. at 2382–83. 
 215. Id. at 2381. 
 216. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2305 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 217. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 582 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 218. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 164 (2010). 
 219. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 536 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring).  
 220. Id.  See also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(contending that in First Amendment cases, the Court must decide if a “statute works speech-related harm 
that is out of proportion to its justifications”); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) 
(Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that “where a law significantly implicates competing constitutionally 
protected interests in complex ways,” the Court has “balanced interests” in a manner that asks “whether 
the statute burdens any one such interest in a manner out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects 
upon the others”). 
 221. Carmen Maye, Public-College Student-Athletes and Game-Time Anthem Protests: Is There a 
Need for a Constitutional-Analytical Audible?, 24 COMM. L. & POL’Y 55, 89 (2019). 
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is permissible—whether, in other words, the regulation is proportionate to the 
government’s regulatory objective—depends in no small part on whether (and the 
extent to which) core First Amendment values are harmed. 
So how did Breyer apply his proportionality approach in Brunetti?  First, and 
importantly, he did not use proportionality when addressing the statutory bar on 
registering immoral marks.  That is because Breyer expressly agreed with the 
majority that this provision violated the First Amendment.222  The majority, it will 
be recalled, concluded the ban on immoral marks (as well as scandalous ones) was 
unconstitutional because it allowed the PTO to engage in viewpoint 
discrimination.223 
A likely implication of Breyer’s agreement with the majority that the immoral 
marks clause was doomed due to its viewpoint-based nature is this:  If there actually 
is a traditional and categorical doctrine to which Breyer firmly subscribes, it is the 
one against viewpoint discrimination.  This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that 
in Matal v. Tam, where all of the justices (Breyer included) agreed that the 
disparagement clause also was impermissibly viewpoint-based,224 Breyer did not 
write separately either to laud the advantages of proportionality or to denigrate the 
Court’s typical categorical approach to analyzing free speech issues.  Instead, he 
simply joined an opinion authored by Justice Alito that concluded “the 
disparagement clause discriminates on the bases of ‘viewpoint.’”225  In brief, in both 
Brunetti and Tam, Breyer declined to apply proportionality when he deemed bars on 
marks—immoral ones in Brunetti, disparaging ones in Tam—to facilitate viewpoint 
discrimination. 
Further supporting the idea that Breyer is keen to adhering to the doctrine against 
viewpoint-based discrimination is his dissent in National Institute of Family & Life 
Advocates v. Becerra.226  There, in criticizing the majority for applying heightened 
scrutiny because it deemed the law was content-based,227 Breyer opined that “the 
majority says nothing about limiting its language to the kind of instance where the 
Court has traditionally found the First Amendment wary of content-based laws, 
namely, in cases of viewpoint discrimination.”228  He added in Becerra, when 
referring to laws affecting speech about abortion, that “we can do our best to interpret 
American constitutional law so that it applies fairly within a Nation whose citizens 
 
 222. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2308 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 223. Id. at 2299 (majority opinion). 
 224. Id. at 2297 (noting that while the Court in Tam “split between two non-majority opinions, all 
Members of the Court agreed that the provision violated the First Amendment because it discriminated on 
the basis of viewpoint”). 
 225. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017); see also id. at 1751 (noting that Breyer joined in 
all parts of Justice Alito’s opinion). 
 226. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2379 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 227. See id. at 2380 (“Before turning to the specific law before us, I focus upon the general 
interpretation of the First Amendment that the majority says it applies.  It applies heightened scrutiny to 
the Act because the Act, in its view, is ‘content based.’”). 
 228. Id. at 2381. 
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strongly hold these different points of view.”229  Viewed collectively, these two 
observations in Becerra, along with his assertion there that “the need for 
evenhandedness” is “particularly weighty” on topics about which “Americans hold 
strong, and differing, views,”230 clearly suggest that Justice Breyer agrees with the 
general principle that laws that discriminate unfairly based on viewpoint are 
impermissible. 
Additionally and more recently, Breyer in 2019 joined Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s 
dissent in Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck.231  Sotomayor wrote that 
regardless of the nature of the forum involved in a First Amendment speech case, 
“the important point . . . is that viewpoint discrimination is impermissible in them 
all.”232  Thus, when the four cases are interpreted in the aggregate, Brunetti, Tam, 
Becerra, and Halleck indicate that Breyer concurs with the traditional doctrine that 
viewpoint discrimination generally is verboten in First Amendment jurisprudence. 
Although Breyer forwent proportionality when considering the bar on immoral 
marks, he embraced it when analyzing the proscription against scandalous ones.  In 
doing so, he initially concluded, as noted above,233 that the statutory term 
“scandalous” narrowly referred “only to certain highly ‘vulgar’ or ‘obscene’ modes 
of expression.”234  With the statute thus tautly construed, Breyer then applied 
proportionality, asking whether barring registration of scandalous marks worked 
harm to First Amendment speech interests that was disproportionate to the 
government’s interests in regulating them.235 
Initially considering the harm-to-speech-interests facet, Breyer concluded “[n]ot 
much” harm arose, especially given that scandalous marks can still be used even after 
the PTO denies registration.236  Additionally, because speech serves a very specific 
function in trademark law—helping consumers identify the origin of goods and 
services237—and because the government heavily regulates other types of marks that 
obstruct or frustrate this interest,238 individuals seeking registration should know 
 
 229. Id. at 2388. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1934 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). 
 232. Id. at 1936. 
 233. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2304–07 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); see also supra notes 174–176 and accompanying text (describing how Breyer narrowly 
interpreted the meaning of “scandalous”). 
 234. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2304 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 235. See id. at 2306 (“I believe we should focus on the interests the First Amendment protects and 
ask a more basic proportionality question:  Does ‘the regulation at issue wor[k] harm to First Amendment 
interests that is disproportionate in light of the relevant regulatory objectives’”? (quoting Reed v. Town 
of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2235–36 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring))). 
 236. Id. (“The statute leaves businesses free to use highly vulgar or obscene words on their products, 
and even to use such words directly next to other registered marks.  Indeed, a business owner might even 
use a vulgar word as a trademark, provided that he or she is willing to forgo the benefits of registration.”). 
 237. Id. 
 238. See id. (“As I have noted, that mission, by its very nature, requires the Government to impose 
limitations on speech. . . . Trademark law therefore forbids the registration of certain types of words—for 
example, those that will likely ‘cause confusion,’ or those that are ‘merely descriptive.’” (citation omitted) 
(quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052 (d)–(e) (2019))). 
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they cannot register any mark they desire.239  Put differently, core First Amendment 
values for Justice Breyer, such as discovering truth in the marketplace of ideas240 or 
protecting political speech that facilitates democratic self-governance,241 are not at 
stake when it comes to barring marks in trademark law that are scandalous due to 
their mode of expression. 
Turning to the other part of the proportionality equation—the government’s 
interests and objectives in regulating speech—Breyer identified three key reasons 
justifying denial of registration to scandalous marks:  (1) not associating the 
government with such marks or lending the government’s power and imprimatur to 
promoting them;242 (2) the negative effects such marks have on consumers, including 
their strong emotional, attentional, and memory-grabbing power that threatens not 
only to “distract consumers and disrupt commerce,” but also to spark verbal and 
physical altercations with offended individuals;243 and (3) reducing the likelihood, 
through non-registration, that children will be exposed to them in public places.244  
In brief, denial of registration, although not preventing the use of such marks, may 
“disincentivize” their use because the mark holders are denied “the benefit[s] of 
trademark registration.”245  This disincentive to use a mark, in turn, reduces the 
likelihood of the occurrence of the second and third negative effects above. 
Balancing these interests, Breyer concluded that “not very much” harm was 
worked to First Amendment free speech interests, while a narrowed definition of 
“scandalous,” focusing only on the mode of expression, was “a reasonable way— 
perhaps the only way—to further legitimate government interests.”246  In other 
words, the harm caused to First Amendment interests was not disproportionate to the 
competing interests in barring registration, thus allowing Breyer to uphold the 
“scandalous” provision as narrowly interpreted.247  In summary, Brunetti handed 
 
 239. See id. (reasoning that “an applicant who seeks to register a mark should not expect complete 
freedom to say what she wishes, but should instead expect linguistic regulation”). 
 240. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2382–83 (2018) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that he values “widely accepted First Amendment goals,” including 
protecting speech in the marketplace of ideas to facilitate the discovery of the truth, in appropriate cases). 
 241. As Justice Breyer has written, political speech “lies at the heart of the First Amendment.”  
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).  See Cass R. Sunstein, 
Constitutional Caution, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 361, 373 (1996) (“The heart of the First Amendment lies 
in democratic self-governance, and when the government regulates political speech, there is special basis 
for suspicion.” (citation omitted)). 
 242. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2307 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that 
“when the Government registers a mark, it is necessarily ‘involv[ed] in promoting’ that mark,’” and adding 
that “[t]he Government has at least a reasonable interest in ensuring that it is not involved in promoting 
highly vulgar or obscene speech, and that it will not be associated with such speech”). 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. (“[S]ome consumers . . . believe that such words should not be displayed in public spaces . . . 
where children are likely to be present.  They may believe that trademark registration of such words could 
make it more likely that children will be exposed to public displays involving such words.  To that end, 
the Government may have an interest in protecting the sensibilities of children by barring the registration 
of such words.”). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 2308. 
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Breyer another opportunity to:  (1) attack the Court’s traditional approach to 
analyzing free speech cases; (2) explicate his proportionality methodology; and (3) 
illustrate how proportionality applies to a specific set of facts. 
B. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR ON SCRUTINY IN AN OFFENSIVE-MODE-OF-
EXPRESSION ANALYSIS IN TRADEMARK LAW 
Under the Court’s traditional approach to analyzing First Amendment speech 
cases, content-based laws generally are subject to review under the stringent strict 
scrutiny standard.248  In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the Court held 
that a statute survives strict scrutiny only if “it is justified by a compelling 
government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest.”249  This test 
involves two prongs:  (1) initially proving a compelling interest; and (2) then 
demonstrating that the means serving it are sufficiently narrowly tailored.250  In short, 
“even if a law advances a compelling government interest, it will fail strict scrutiny 
and be held unconstitutional if there is any other way to advance the governmental 
interest that would restrict less speech.”251  Laws rarely survive strict scrutiny 
review.252 
The Court’s 2015 opinion in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, which struck down a sign 
ordinance for failing this test,253 suggested to some scholars “that if a regulation 
distinguishes speech according to content on its face, strict scrutiny review applies 
‘regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack 
of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech.’”254  As Professors 
Dan Kozlowski and Derigan Silver explain, Justice Clarence Thomas’s opinion for 
the Court in Reed “did not make a distinction between laws that target different 
categories of speech.  Justice Thomas wrote in broad strokes, as if all content-based 
laws, even those that target less protected areas of speech such as commercial speech, 
should be subjected to strict scrutiny.”255  Others have claimed that Reed 
“dramatically altered the distinction between content-neutral and content-based 
 
 248. See Lakier, supra note 195, at 233; Jason M. Shepard, The First Amendment and Mandatory 
Condom Laws: Rethinking the “Porn Exception” in Strict Scrutiny, Content Neutrality and Secondary 
Effects Analysis, 19 NEV. L.J. 86, 108 (2018). 
 249. Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 250. See generally R. George Wright, Electoral Lies and the Broader Problems of Strict Scrutiny, 
64 FLA. L. REV. 759, 777 (2012) (identifying strict scrutiny as having “two prongs” and specifying the 
first prong as requiring a “compelling government interest” and the second prong as requiring “sufficiently 
narrow tailoring”). 
 251. Kozlowski & Silver, supra note 189, at 194–95. 
 252. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1666 (2015) (calling the case before it “one 
of the rare cases in which a speech restriction withstands strict scrutiny”). 
 253. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 U.S. 2218, 2224 (2015) (noting that the sign ordinance identified 
“various categories of signs based on the type of information they convey, then subject[ed] each category 
to different restrictions,” and concluding that “these provisions are content-based regulations of speech 
that cannot survive strict scrutiny”). 
 254. Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Making Sense of Secondary Effects Analysis After Reed v. Town of 
Gilbert, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 385, 388 (2017) (quoting Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228). 
 255. Kozlowski & Silver, supra note 189, at 192. 
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laws,”256 partly because Justice Thomas wrote that “an innocuous justification 
cannot transform a facially content-based law into one that is content neutral”257 and 
“strict scrutiny applies either when a law is content based on its face or when the 
purpose and justification for the law are content based.”258 
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion in Brunetti is highly significant because while she 
concluded that the statute targeting scandalous marks—as she narrowly interpreted 
it259—was content-based,260 she also found that it was viewpoint-neutral and not 
subject to strict scrutiny.261  For Sotomayor, context was key in making the 
determination that viewpoint-neutral forms of content discrimination are not always 
subject to strict scrutiny.  The crucial context in Brunetti was that of “discretionary 
governmental program or limited forum typified by the trademark-registration 
system.”262  The federal trademark registration program is discretionary, Sotomayor 
explained, because Congress had no obligation to create it.263  In turn, she found “no 
evidence that speech or commerce would be endangered if the Government were not 
to provide it at all.”264  Alternatively, the federal trademark program can be viewed 
as a limited public forum, where the government creates a space or adopts an 
initiative that facilitates “some forms of expression without restricting others.”265  
The government typically can restrict speech in limited public forums as long as a 
regulation is merely reasonable and not viewpoint-based.266 
In these two contexts—government discretionary programs and limited public 
forums—Sotomayor determined that the applicable standard of review for testing the 
validity of a government regulation on speech was neither strict nor intermediate 
 
 256. Wegner & Norchi, supra note 195, at 600.  
 257. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228. 
 258. Id.  
 259. See supra notes 138–139 (addressing Justice Sotomayor’s narrow construction of this facet of 
the statute at issue in Brunetti). 
 260. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2314 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and  
dissenting in part) (“A restriction on trademarks featuring obscenity, vulgarity, or profanity is similarly 
viewpoint neutral, though it is naturally content-based.”). 
 261. Sotomayor explained here that: 
While the Court has often subjected even viewpoint-neutral content discrimination to strict 
constitutional scrutiny . . . there are contexts in which it does not. . . .  When that is the case, the 
difference between viewpoint-based and viewpoint-neutral content discrimination can be decisive.  
The federal trademark-registration system is such a context. 
Id. at 2315–16 (citations omitted). 
 262. Id. at 2313. 
 263. Id. at 2316. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (2010) (noting that “the Court has 
permitted restrictions on access to a limited public forum . . . with this key caveat:  Any access barrier 
must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral”). 
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scrutiny,267 but rather mere reasonableness.268  This approximates the very 
deferential rational basis standard of review.269  That standard typically applies when 
measuring the validity of economic and social welfare regulations,270 while it 
generally “plays an extremely limited role in free speech cases.”271 
Applying this reasonableness standard to her narrow construction of the term 
“scandalous” as only banning the registration of obscene, profane, or vulgar marks, 
Sotomayor concluded that the clause was constitutional.272  She believed “the 
Government has an interest in not promoting certain kinds of speech, whether 
because such speech could be perceived as suggesting governmental favoritism or 
 
 267. See Leslie Kendrick, Nonsense on Sidewalks: Content Discrimination in McCullen v. Coakley, 
2014 SUP. CT. REV. 215, 238 (2014) (remarking that intermediate scrutiny “has historically required that 
the law be ‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest’ and that it leaves open ‘ample 
alternative channels of communication.’” (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 
(1989))); R. George Wright, Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations of Speech:  A Distinction 
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requires the government to demonstrate “a significant or substantial government interest” being served by 
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 268. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2317 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Whether he may register his mark can therefore turn on reasonable, viewpoint-neutral content 
regulations.” (emphasis added)). 
 269. See Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Reasonableness, 102 MINN. L. REV. 61, 64 (2017) 
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using some form of the word reasonable to define the rational basis test.”). 
 270. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rational Basis Test Is Constitutional (and Desirable), 14 GEO. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 402 (2016) (asserting that “the Court has basically gotten it right about when to 
apply the rational basis test—using it to analyze government economic regulations and social welfare 
legislation when there is no discrimination based on a suspect classification or infringement of a 
fundamental right” (emphasis added)). 
 271. Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 787 (2007).  The Court uses a variant of rational basis review 
when considering the speech rights of public school students when their speech is either sponsored by the 
school or occurs within the curriculum.  Specifically, the Court has held “that educators do not offend the 
First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.”  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).  Erwin Chemerinsky deems 
this a “classic phrasing of the rational basis review.”  Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hazelwooding of the First 
Amendment: The Deference To Authority, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 291, 294 (2013).  Additionally, the 
Court applies a form of rational basis review in some situations where the government compels the 
disclosure of factual information related to services provided by individuals, such as attorneys.  See 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (holding “that an advertiser’s rights 
are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest 
in preventing deception of consumers”); see also Lili Levi, A “Faustian Pact”? Native Advertising and 
the Future of the Press, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 681 (2015) (observing that the test in Zauderer is “akin to 
rational basis review”); but see Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 
(2018) (rejecting the application of Zauderer’s rational basis test when considering the constitutionality 
of a compelled-speech obligation imposed on licensed crisis pregnancy centers in California). 
 272. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2317 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Prohibiting the registration of obscene, profane, or vulgar marks qualifies as reasonable, viewpoint-
neutral, content-based regulation.”). 
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simply because the Government does not wish to involve itself with that kind of 
speech.”273  In brief, the PTO had a reasonable interest in not indirectly supporting, 
via the benefits that flow from federal registration, obscene, vulgar, and profane 
marks.274 
In summary, Justice Sotomayor created a contextually driven carve-out from the 
general rule articulated in Reed that strict scrutiny applies to facially content-based 
laws.  In the process of doing so, she also paved a possible path forward for the 
constitutionality of a redrafted statute barring registration of scandalous marks in 
accord with her narrow interpretation of that term. 
Furthermore, her focus on regulating speech due to an offensive mode of 
expression, independent of any substantive viewpoints or ideas conveyed, suggests 
a new line of attack on—or, at least, a potential detour route around—Justice 
Thomas’s logic in Reed regarding when strict scrutiny applies.  In Reed, Thomas 
contended that a law is content-based if it “applies to particular speech because of 
the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.”275  An offensive-mode-of-
expression regulation, as articulated by Sotomayor, that censors speech regardless of 
(not “because of,” to use Thomas’s term above) the topics, ideas, and messages 
discussed, arguably evades this definition’s reach.276  In brief, it is possible that 
statutes targeting how something is said, and not the underlying content, can avoid 
Thomas’s articulation of when a law is content-based.  Perhaps, then, Justice 
Sotomayor did not need to so readily concede that the “scandalous” clause, as she 
interpreted it, was “naturally content-based.”277 
On the other hand, Thomas also wrote in Reed that a law is content-based if it 
targets “speech based on its communicative content.”278  Even an offensive-mode-
of-expression regulation that applies evenhandedly to all topics, ideas, and messages 
seemingly fits this definition.  This is because, at bottom, the regulation exists 
because the content that is communicated—even if it is just a single word such as 
“fuck” or “shit”—causes those who hear it to take offense. 
The larger, normative question thus raised by an offensive-mode-of-expression 
carve-out in Sotomayor’s Brunetti opinion is this:  If an offensive-mode-of-
expression applies evenhandedly to all topics, all subjects, all ideas, and all 
viewpoints on those topics, subjects, and ideas, then should it presumptively be 
subjected to strict scrutiny instead of the usual intermediate scrutiny test that applies 
to content-neutral laws?279  Put differently, does a law penalizing only what the Court 
in Cohen v. California called the “emotive function”280 of speech, instead of the 
 
 273. Id. 
 274. See id. (“The Government has a reasonable interest in refraining from lending its ancillary 
support to marks that are obscene, vulgar, or profane.”). 
 275. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015). 
 276. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2310 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(explaining that, under her interpretation of it, “the ‘scandalous’ clause covers marks that are offensive 
because of the mode of expression, apart from any particular message or idea”). 
 277. Id. at 2314. 
 278. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226. 
 279. See supra note 267 and accompanying text (addressing the intermediate scrutiny test). 
 280. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). 
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“cognitive content of individual speech,”281 either presumptively or always demand 
the application of strict scrutiny just because it affects content?  Just how important, 
in other words, is the emotive function of speech?  Is it so important that its 
jeopardization presumptively demands strict scrutiny, just because content is put into 
play? 
It is crucial to remember here that the Court’s famous language regarding the need 
to protect offensive speech, penned eighteen years after Cohen in Texas v. Johnson, 
focused on the substantive ideas conveyed, not on the emotive function of speech:  
“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the 
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds 
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”282  What standard of scrutiny, then, should 
apply to an offensive-mode-of-expression regulation that does not arise in the narrow 
context of a government discretionary program or a limited public forum, as 
Sotomayor viewed the context of the government’s trademark registration system in 
Brunetti?283  Would it be the deferential reasonableness test Sotomayor applied in 
Brunetti, or would it be some form of heightened scrutiny (be it strict or intermediate 
scrutiny), or perhaps even the proportionality tack that Breyer used in Brunetti? 
After all, the Court in Cohen v. California neither used the term “strict scrutiny” 
nor articulated and deployed a two-part test such as strict scrutiny. 284  Yet, the Court 
in Cohen rejected the notion that states like California could punish the use of words 
such as “fuck” in public venues like courthouses in order to safeguard “public 
morality.”285 
If a governmental entity today were to adopt an offensive-mode-of-expression 
regulation for public parks—venues long considered traditional public forums where 
content-based regulations of speech are subject to strict scrutiny286—that are 
regularly frequented by large numbers of young children, does Brunetti provide a 
possible work-around from strict scrutiny?  Why couldn’t intermediate scrutiny 
apply?  It is a balancing test that typically applies to content-neutral laws.287  
 
 281. Id.  
 282. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (emphasis added). 
 283. See supra notes 261–265 (addressing Sotomayor’s articulation of this context within Brunetti). 
 284. Cohen v. California was decided in 1971, prior to the Court’s ruling in Police Department of 
Chicago v. Mosley, which firmly established that “content control” is the essence of forbidden censorship, 
asserting that “above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”  Police Dep’t of Chicago v. 
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972).  See also Daniel A. Farber, Playing Favorites? Justice Scalia, 
Abortion Protests, and Judicial Impartiality, 101 MINN. L. REV. 23, 27 (2016) (“The Court applies a much 
more stringent test to speech restrictions that relate to content.  The content distinction found its first clear 
expression in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley.”). 
 285. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22 (1971).  
 286. See Maye, supra note 221, at 67–68 (“Public streets, parks and the like are traditional public 
forums; any content-based restriction on speech in traditional public fora must satisfy strict scrutiny.”); 
Laura Rene McNeal, Hush Don’t Say a Word: Safeguarding Students’ Freedom of Expression in the 
Trump Era, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 280 n.167 (2019) (“It is well established in constitutional 
jurisprudence that content-based restrictions that occur in traditional public forums are subject to strict 
scrutiny.”). 
 287. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
189, 190 (1983) (“The Supreme Court tests the constitutionality of content-neutral restrictions with an 
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Applying it here, courts would consider if there were ample alternative avenues and 
venues for communicating messages in an emotive fashion,288 thereby 
accommodating the emotive speech interest that is balanced against the 
government’s significant interest in shielding young children from offensive modes 
of expression. Recall that Justice Breyer was concerned in Brunetti about the display 
of offensive trademarks in public places where children are present,289 and that 
Justice Sotomayor used children as a benchmark for determining which words are 
“scandalous” and thus fall within the confines of her offensive-mode-of-expression 
interpretation of that term.290 
Ultimately, the justices’ disagreements in recent First Amendment cases such as 
National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra291 and Janus v. American 
Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees292 over when heightened 
scrutiny should apply, provide a propitious opening for considering whether strict 
scrutiny is presumptively mandated when evaluating offensive-mode-of-expression 
regulations in factual contexts beyond those of Brunetti.  The ultimate impact of 
Brunetti’s mode-of-expression logic on Reed’s notion of when strict scrutiny applies 
remains to be seen.  At this point, however, it is clear that neither Justice Breyer nor 
Justice Sotomayor would apply strict scrutiny—the former would use 
 
essentially open-ended form of balancing.”). 
 288. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (requiring courts to consider 
whether content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations “leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information” (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 
293 (1984))). 
 289. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.  
 290. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2311 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and  
dissenting in part) (asserting scandalous vulgarity and profanity should be defined, in part, by whether or 
not the words in question are “commonly used around children”). 
 291. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).  The majority in Becerra applied intermediate scrutiny in holding that 
the compelled-speech obligation imposed on licensed crisis pregnancy centers was likely unconstitutional.  
See id. at 2375 (“[T]he licensed notice cannot survive even intermediate scrutiny.  California asserts a 
single interest to justify the licensed notice:  providing low-income women with information about state-
sponsored services.  Assuming that this is a substantial state interest, the licensed notice is not sufficiently 
drawn to achieve it.”).  In contrast, the dissent applied a deferential standard of reasonableness and, in 
doing, deemed the provision likely constitutional.  See id. at 2381–87 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing 
that “[h]istorically, the Court has been wary of claims that regulation of business activity, particularly 
health-related activity, violates the Constitution,” noting that the government historically has been able to 
impose “reasonable requirements” and “reasonable conditions” on such activities (including those of 
medical professionals), and concluding that when it comes to laws requiring medical professionals to 
disclose factual information, “[t]here is no reason to subject such laws to heightened scrutiny”). 
 292. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).  In Janus, the majority spurned the notion that rational basis review 
applied in analyzing the constitutionality of a state mandate that compelled nonunion members to pay so-
called agency or fair share fees to the union that exclusively bargained on their behalf.  See id. at 2465 
(“This form of minimal scrutiny is foreign to our free-speech jurisprudence, and we reject it here.”).  
Justice Samuel Alito, penning the majority opinion, explained that “[b]ecause the compelled subsidization 
of private speech seriously impinges on First Amendment rights, it cannot be casually allowed.”  Id. at 
2464.  In contrast, the dissent argued that “government entities have substantial latitude to regulate their 
employees’ speech.”  Id. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  Justice Elena Kagan unflinchingly characterized 
the majority’s heightened scrutiny approach as “weaponizing the First Amendment.”  Id. at 2501.  As she 
bluntly put it, “the majority has chosen the winners by turning the First Amendment into a sword, and 
using it against workaday economic and regulatory policy.”  Id.  
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proportionality, the latter would use a reasonableness standard—to measure the 
validity of a future federal statute banning registration by the PTO of marks that are 
scandalous due solely to their mode of expression. 
III. CONNECTING THE AGENCY DOTS BETWEEN THE PTO AND THE 
FCC:  WILL BRUNETTI EMBOLDEN THE FCC TO REGULATE 
PROFANITY? 
Just as the PTO is a federal agency engaged in the business of regulating speech 
when it comes to registering trademarks,293 the FCC is a federal agency that makes 
decisions affecting free expression, but in a different realm.  Specifically, Congress 
has vested the FCC with authority to punish over-the-air broadcasters for 
transmitting content that is obscene, indecent, or profane.294 
It is the FCC’s regulatory power over the last of those three content categories—
profane language—where Brunetti may exert some subtle, although clearly not 
requisite or binding, influence.  In particular, both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Sotomayor contended in Brunetti that the PTO should have authority to deny 
registration to marks that are profane in their mode of expression and that such power 
does not violate the First Amendment freedom of speech.295 
This is significant because the FCC, perhaps fearing the unconstitutionality of its 
own regulatory power over profane language on the airwaves, has virtually 
abandoned its enforcement against such expression.296  In fact, the FCC in 1976 
“recommended that Congress revoke the Commission’s authority over profane 
language due to concerns that it was likely unconstitutional.”297  Furthermore, since 
2007 and as of 2019, the FCC had “not issued a single Notice of Apparent Liability 
for profanity (in contrast to indecency).”298  It is thus safe to conclude that the 
commission’s enforcement of its power over profane language is, at minimum,  
 
 293. See Lisa P. Ramsey, Trademark Law Institute for Intellectual Property & Information Law 
Symposium: Free Speech Challenges To Trademark Law After Matal v. Tam, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 403, 415 
(2018) (observing that the Supreme Court in Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017), “clarified that use of 
a trademark is ‘speech,’ and is not akin to non-expressive conduct or economic activities outside the First 
Amendment’s scope, when the Court held that the disparagement clause was subject to constitutional 
scrutiny”). 
 294. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2012) (“Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by 
means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or 
both.”). 
 295. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2303 (2019) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (concluding that “refusing registration to obscene, vulgar, or profane marks does not 
offend the First Amendment.  Whether such marks can be registered does not affect the extent to which 
their owners may use them in commerce to identify goods.  No speech is being restricted; no one is being 
punished” (emphasis added)); id. at 2313 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Adopting a narrow construction for the word ‘scandalous’—interpreting it to regulate only obscenity, 
vulgarity, and profanity—would save it from unconstitutionality.” (emphasis added)). 
 296. See Lili Levi, “Smut and Nothing But”: The FCC, Indecency, and Regulatory Transformations 
in the Shadows, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 509, 547 n.160 (2013) (observing that by the time the case of FCC v. 
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239 (2012), returned to the Supreme Court in 2012, the FCC 
“appeared to have retired profanity as an independent category for indecency violations”). 
 297. Calvert, Merging, supra note 117, at 182–83.  
 298. Id. at 153. 
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moribund. 
Yet despite these facts, the FCC today continues to state on its website that 
“[f]ederal law prohibits obscene, indecent and profane content from being broadcast 
on the radio or TV.”299  In turn, the Commission defines profane expression there as 
“‘grossly offensive’ language that is considered a public nuisance.”300  This stands 
in contrast to its former explication of profane language as only narrowly including 
religious blasphemy and divine imprecation.301 
Given the willingness in 2019 of both Republican-nominated Chief Justice John 
Roberts302 and Democrat-nominated Sonia Sotomayor303 to allow the PTO to deny 
registration to trademarks that are profane, might not the FCC view this as suggesting 
that a carefully drafted definition of profanity that focuses only on the mode of 
expression might be constitutional as applied to broadcasters?  In other words, the 
opinions in Brunetti of both a perceived conservative and a perceived liberal might 
embolden the FCC to more aggressively enforce its authority over profane language. 
Buttressing this notion is the fact in 2006 the FCC attempted to clarify what it 
meant by profane language, concluding that “certain vulgar sexual or excretory terms 
are so grossly offensive to members of the public that they amount to a nuisance and 
are presumptively profane.”304  The emphasized word “vulgar” is significant because 
both Roberts and Sotomayor in Brunetti used that exact word when defining the 
power they believed the PTO should be able to wield against registering offensive 
marks.305  Similarly, Justice Breyer believed the PTO should have authority to deny 
 
 299. Consumer Guide: Obscene, Indecent and Profane Broadcasts, FCC, https://perma.cc/28LK-
EK53 (last visited Oct. 2, 2019).  
 300. Id.  
 301. As the FCC explained in 2004: 
Broadcasters are on notice that the Commission in the future will not limit its definition of profane 
speech to only those words and phrases that contain an element of blasphemy or divine 
imprecation, but, depending on the context, will also consider under the definition of “profanity” 
the “F-Word” and those words (or variants thereof) that are as highly offensive as the “F-Word,” 
to the extent such language is broadcast between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m.  We will analyze other 
potentially profane words or phrases on a case-by-case basis. 
Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden Globe Awards” 
Program, 19 FCC RCD. 4975, 4981 (2004).  
 302. See Current Members: John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice of the United States, 
SUPREMECOURT.GOV, https://perma.cc/4N68-2BRW (last visited Sept. 15, 2019) (“President George W. 
Bush nominated him as Chief Justice of the United States, and he took his seat September 29, 2005.”). 
 303. See Current Members: Sonia Sotomayor, Associate Justice, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, https://
perma.cc/4N68-2BRW (last visited Sept. 15, 2019) (“President Barack Obama nominated her as an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court on May 26, 2009, and she assumed this role August 8, 2009.”). 
 304. Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002 and March 
8, 2005, 21 FCC RCD. 2664, 2669 (2016) (emphasis added).   
 305. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2303 (2019) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (concluding that “refusing registration to obscene, vulgar, or profane marks does not 
offend the First Amendment.  Whether such marks can be registered does not affect the extent to which 
their owners may use them in commerce to identify goods.  No speech is being restricted; no one is being 
punished” (emphasis added)); id. at 2313 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Adopting a narrow construction for the word ‘scandalous’—interpreting it to regulate only obscenity, 
vulgarity, and profanity—would save it from unconstitutionality.” (emphasis added)). 
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registration to “highly vulgar”306 marks, while Justice Alito suggested that Congress 
might adopt “a more carefully focused statute that precludes the registration of marks 
containing vulgar terms that play no real part in the expression of ideas.”307  By 
focusing its definition of profanity on the term “vulgarity,” the FCC might have a 
winning argument with at least some of the justices that its power over profane 
language is constitutional. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Protecting the right to federally register a trademark for just one single word—a 
made-up one, no less308—that suggestively sounds like another word, a real one 
imbued with taboo overtones309 that the Court previously had safeguarded back in 
1971.310  On the surface, and perhaps from a layperson’s perspective, that is all that 
the case of Iancu v. Brunetti was about. 
However, the fact that one coined word in Brunetti spawned five different 
opinions (including three dissenting in part311) suggests that the case implicated far 
more than just Erik Brunetti’s ability to register “FUCT” as a mark for a line of 
clothing.312  Furthermore, Brunetti proved to be much more than a simple redo of the 
Court’s trademark decision two years prior in Matal v. Tam,313 which was rendered 
without dissent314 and in which, as Justice Kagan pointed out in Brunetti, all of the 
justices agreed that the statutory clause at issue was impermissibly viewpoint-
based.315  Brunetti, in other words, was not Tam II. 
From a principles-reaffirming standpoint, Brunetti pounded home the point that 
viewpoint-based discrimination in speech cases is forbidden when private 
individuals, as opposed to government entities, are speaking.316  Indeed, the principle 
 
 306. Id. at 2307 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 307. Id. at 2303 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 308. Erik Brunetti, in fact, claimed that “FUCT” is supposed to be “pronounced as four letters, one 
after another” rather than as a single word.  Brief for Respondent at 1, Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 
(2019) (No. 18-302).  He contended that “[t]o the extent FUCT has a meaning, it is FRIENDS U CAN’T 
TRUST.”  Id. at 2. 
 309. See Christopher M. Fairman, Institutionalized Word Taboo: The Continuing Saga of FCC 
Indecency Regulation, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 567, 616 (noting that “fuck” is one of “many of our taboo 
words . . . [that] involve sex and sex organs” and adding that “[t]he work of psycholinguists show[s] that 
the taboo status of ‘fuck’ stems from our deep and dark subconscious feelings about sex”). 
 310. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 311. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 
2304 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2308 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 312. See id. at 2297 (majority opinion) (noting that Erik Brunetti “founded a clothing line that uses 
the trademark FUCT”). 
 313. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
 314. See supra notes 6–12 and accompanying text (addressing the Court’s ruling in Tam). 
 315. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2297 (“Although split between two non-majority opinions, all 
Members of the Court agreed that the provision violated the First Amendment because it discriminated on 
the basis of viewpoint.”). 
 316. See supra Part I.B (addressing how Brunetti reinforces the rule against viewpoint 
discrimination); see also supra notes 56–62 and accompanying text (addressing how the government 
speech doctrine allows governmental entities to engage in viewpoint discrimination when they are 
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against viewpoint discrimination is what doomed the “immoral” clause for all nine 
justices.317 
This reinforcement of a legal doctrine aside, however, Brunetti throws—in the 
parlance of our times—some serious shade at the long-standing notion that the Court 
almost unflinchingly, with very few exceptions, protects offensive speech in the face 
of government censorship.318  That is because:  (1) three justices (Roberts, Breyer, 
and Sotomayor) were willing to save the “scandalous” clause by giving it a limiting 
construction;319 (2) one justice (Alito), although unwilling to give “scandalous” a 
saving construction, proposed a specific way that Congress might redraft the statute 
to permissibly target certain types of offensive language;320 and (3) the six-justice 
majority stressed that it offered no opinion regarding whether a statutory provision 
targeting only offensive modes of expression might pass constitutional muster.  In 
the process, one justice also expressed language-driven concerns about the 
“coarsen[ing] [of] our popular culture”321 and two were explicitly worried about 
racist speech.322  The justices, in a nutshell, are concerned about offensive 
expression.  In short, why offer saving constructions or possible modes of redrafting 
a statute if there is not some belief among the justices that there are outer limits and 
boundaries on protecting offensive speech, especially when doing so, in the form of 
registering a trademark, conveys government-created benefits upon it? 
The possibility of an offensive-mode-of-expression carve-out from First 
Amendment protection, even if only within the highly regulated realm of federal 
trademark registration where denial does not prohibit use, is intriguing.  As argued 
above, Justice Sotomayor’s articulation of such an offensive-mode-of-expression 
provision goes a long way to clarifying that there is, indeed, a key difference between 
speech that offends because of a substantive viewpoint or idea and speech that 
offends merely because of the manner or mode of expressing that viewpoint or 
idea.323  In brief, her opinion illustrates that Justice Alito may have oversimplified 
matters when he wrote in Tam that “[g]iving offense is a viewpoint.”324 
The devil, of course, would be in the definitional details if Congress were to take 
 
considered to be speaking, rather than private individuals). 
 317. See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text (noting how the six-justice majority concluded 
the immoral clause was viewpoint-based, and describing how Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer 
and Sotomayor also agreed, in their separate opinions, that this clause impermissibly allowed for 
viewpoint discrimination). 
 318. See supra Part I.A (addressing the Court’s general protection of offensive speech, as well as 
some exceptions to such protection). 
 319. See supra Part I.C.3.b, I.C.3.d, and I.C.3.e (addressing, respectively, how Roberts, Sotomayor 
and Breyer would narrowly interpret the meaning of scandalous to save it from unconstitutionality).  
 320. See supra Part I.C.3.c (addressing Justice Alito’s concurring opinion). 
 321. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2303 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 322. See id. at 2307 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (remarking that “the list of 
swear words may be evolving yet again, perhaps in the direction of including race-based epithets,” and 
pondering how one “might react if you saw someone wearing a t-shirt or using a product emblazoned with 
an odious racial epithet”); id. at 2311 n.5 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (fretting 
that “the Government will now presumably be compelled to register” what she described as “one 
particularly egregious racial epithet”).  
 323. See supra Part I.C.3.d. 
 324. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017). 
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up this approach and redraft the scandalous provision accordingly.  Terms such as 
“profanity” and “vulgarity,” when used to give meaning to the word “scandalous,” 
would seemingly need to be well defined to avoid a possible, if not inevitable, 
vagueness challenge.325 
This Article also emphasized Brunetti’s potentially disruptive influence on 
traditional standards of scrutiny in First Amendment law.  Specifically, Justice 
Breyer continued his nearly indefatigable assault on a categorical approach to 
scrutiny while he simultaneously propounded proportionality.326  This Article 
suggested, however, that Breyer may actually subscribe to the established doctrine 
banning viewpoint-based laws targeting private expression.327 
Furthermore, this Article explained how Justice Sotomayor would not apply strict 
scrutiny, but instead only a deferential reasonableness test, to analyze the 
constitutionality of a narrowly drafted offensive-mode-of-expression bar on 
trademark registration, even though she acknowledged such a provision would be 
content-based and thus would presumptively be subject to strict scrutiny.328  The 
Article also questioned whether, in fact, such an offensive-mode-of-expression 
provision actually is content-based, given a definition of that category offered by 
Justice Thomas in Reed.329 
Finally, this Article suggested that the FCC may take some comfort in Brunetti—
specifically, in Chief Justice Roberts’s and Justice Sotomayor’s opinions—that 
enforcing its statutory power over profane language on the broadcast airwaves is 
constitutional.330  Although Brunetti is factually confined to federal trademark 
registration, the reality that it involves another federal agency that operates in another 
highly-regulated space may embolden the FCC to ratchet up its somnambulant 
approach to punishing broadcasters for profanity. 
Erik Brunetti, in brief, won the right to trademark “FUCT.”  Yet, in doing so, he 
may well have nudged the justices closer to creating another carve-out from First 
Amendment protection for offensive speech, at least within the realm of trademark 
law and, perhaps, beyond.  He also may have coaxed Justice Sotomayor into 
concluding that such a regulation would not be subject to strict scrutiny, but would 
face review under a mere reasonableness test.331  Indeed, as this Article suggested, 
an offensive-mode-of-expression arguably might even evade one definition of a 
content-based law offered by Justice Thomas in Reed v. Town of Gilbert.332  If that 
is the case—or even if a possible offensive-mode-of-expression regulation makes the 
justices reconsider how they define content-based laws or reevaluate Reed’s 
presumption that facially content-based laws must surmount strict scrutiny—then 
Erik Brunetti will have influenced First Amendment jurisprudence in ways he 
 
 325. See supra notes 154–155 and accompanying text (addressing likely problems with vagueness). 
 326. See supra Part II.A (addressing Breyer’s views on scrutiny in Brunetti). 
 327. See supra Part II.A (including Breyer’s views on viewpoint discrimination). 
 328. See supra Part II.B (addressing Sotomayor’s views on scrutiny in Brunetti). 
 329. See supra notes 275–277 and accompanying text. 
 330. See supra Part III. 
 331. See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
 332. See supra notes 275–277 and accompanying text. 
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probably never envisioned, and his case will have been about far more than just one 
sophomoric and sexually-suggestive sounding word. 
 
